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1.  Introduction 
 
  There is increasing interest by academics and policymakers in Mexican migration 
to the United States.  Mexico is the most important source country for U.S. immigration, 
accounting for 34% of total immigrant arrivals since 1990.  In 2004, the 10.5 million 
Mexican  immigrants  living  in  the  United  States  were  31%  of  the  U.S.  foreign-born 
population and equivalent to 10% of the total population of Mexico (see Figure 1).
1  The 
United States has not experienced a concentrated immigration wave of this magnitude 
since the influxes from Germany and Ireland in the mid 19
th century.
2  For Mexico, the 
continuing  population  outflow  is  unprecedented.
3    In  both  countries,  the  cross-border 
flow  of  labor  appears  to  have  affected  the  structure  of  wages,  the  intra-national 
distribution of population, and the pattern of industrial specialization. 
  
  Beyond its scale, the distinguishing feature of Mexican immigration is that most 
new  arrivals  enter  the  United  States  illegally.    In  2004,  there  were  an  estimated  5.9 
million  unauthorized  Mexican  immigrants  in  the  United  States,  among  a  total 
unauthorized  population  of  10.3  million  (Passel,  2005).    Thus,  56%  of  Mexican 
immigrants appear to lack permission to be in the country, compared to 17% of all other 
immigrants.    Large-scale  illegal  immigration  in  the  United  States  is  a  relatively  new 
phenomenon.  It has provoked political debate about whether to provide public services 
to illegal immigrants, grant them status as legal residents, or militarize U.S. borders to 
prevent  further  illegal  inflows.    In  Mexico,  migration  abroad  has  helped  ease  the 
country’s  adjustment  to  rapid  growth  in  its  working-age  population  and  to 
macroeconomic  shocks,  though  not  without  disrupting  the  families  and  communities 
whose members have moved to the United States. 
  
  There  is  an  emerging  body  of  economic  research  on  illegal  migration  from 
Mexico  to  the  United  States.    This  literature  has  been  made  possible  by  the  recent 
availability of data sources on the cross-border movements of legal and illegal Mexican 
migrants.  Also prompting attention is the realization that, with unauthorized entrants 
accounting  for  over  half  of  Mexican  immigrants  and  over  three  tenths  of  all  U.S. 
immigrants, any discussion of international migration in the United States or Mexico 
ends up confronting the issue of illegality either explicitly or implicitly. 
 
  Much  of  the  initial  research  on  unauthorized  labor  flows  was  done  by  non-
economists.
4  The principal themes of this body of work resemble those in the economics 
literature on internal migration in developing countries (see Lucas, 1997; Rapoport and 
Docquier,  2003).    Early  waves  of  illegal  migration  from  Mexico  appear  to  have 
                                                 
1 Figure 1 reports the total number of Mexican immigrants in the United States (legal and illegal) as a share 
of Mexico’s population, the total U.S. population, and the foreign-born U.S. population.  
2 Over the period 1841 to 1860, Ireland accounted for 39% of U.S. immigration and over the period 1841 to 
1890, Germany accounted for 30% of U.S. immigration (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2004). 
3 The one episode that approaches the current outflow is the Mexican Revolution (1911-1920).  Between 
1911 and 1925, 680,000 legal immigrants from Mexico (or 5% of Mexico’s 1910 population) entered the 
United States (and were joined by a large number of illegal immigrants).  By the late 1920s, many of these 
individuals had returned to Mexico.  See Cardoso (1980) and Alanis (1999). 
4 For reviews of this literature, see Massey et al. (1994) and Espenshade (1995).   2 
originated in rural areas of the country (Cornelius, 1992; Durand, Massey and Zenteno, 
2001), involved households financing the migration of one or more members in return for 
remittances  from the migrants (Durand, 1996;  Durand  et al, 1996), and depended on 
family and community networks that helped migrants enter and find employment in the 
United States (Massey et al., 1994; Massey and Espinosa, 1997). 
 
  Yet,  internal  migration  and  illegal  international  migration  differ  in  important 
respects.  While policy barriers that restrict within-country regional labor flows are rare, 
countries actively regulate the inflow of labor from abroad.  The United States determines 
the level of legal immigration through quotas on entry visas, which change infrequently 
over time.
5  The country implicitly sets the level of illegal immigration through selecting 
the intensity with which it enforces borders against illegal entry.  Key issues for the study 
of illegal migration are how countries choose their border regulation policies and how 
prospective migrants respond to these policies. 
 
  There is a large literature on U.S. immigration, which tends to focus on the labor-
market  consequences  of  immigrant  inflows  and  the  economic  performance  of 
immigrants.
6  This body of work examines, among other questions, whether immigration 
reduces wages for U.S. native workers, whether immigrants make relatively greater use 
of means-tested entitlement programs, and whether earnings, education, fertility, or other 
outcomes for immigrants converge to native levels over time.   
 
  Largely taken for granted in the U.S. literature is why foreign residents migrate to 
the United States.  One obvious reason is that U.S. real wages far exceed those in many 
other countries.  Large wage differentials, coupled with binding and slowly changing 
quotas  on  U.S.  legal  immigration,  create  queues  to  enter  the  United  States.    Given 
extended  delays  in  clearing  such  queues,  annual  variation  in  the  level  of  legal 
immigration  appears  to  be  more  or  less  insensitive  to  contemporaneous  annual 
fluctuations in U.S. or foreign economies.  Perhaps as a result, the quantity of literature 
on the consequences of U.S. legal immigration vastly exceeds that on its causes.
7 
 
  With  illegal  immigration,  the  determinants  of  migrant  flows  and  the  high-
frequency variation of these flows have attracted more attention.  Geographic proximity 
allows  unauthorized  migrants  from  Mexico  to  move  to  the  United  States  relatively 
quickly.  The existence of well-established migration networks enables U.S. employers to 
                                                 
5 The current U.S. immigration quota system was established by the Hart-Cellar Act of 1965 and amended 
by the Immigration Act of 1990.  The 1990 law set a flexible cap for U.S. legal admissions at 675,000 
individuals of which 480,000 are to be family-based, 140,000 are to be employment-based, and 55,000 are 
to be “diversity immigrants.”  Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens are not subject to immigration quotas. 
6 For surveys of this literature, see Smith and Edmonston (1997) and Borjas (1999a, 1999b) and for recent 
work in the area see Borjas (2003) and Card (2005).  For analysis of these issues in the context of Mexican 
immigration, see Smith (2003), Trejo (2003), Blau and Kahn (2005), Borjas and Katz (2005), Card and 
Lewis  (2005),  and  Duncan  and  Trejo  (2005).    There  is  a  smaller  literature  on  the  consequences  of 
emigration for Mexico.  See Mishra (2005) and Hanson (2005a). 
7 Exceptions include Hatton and Williamson (2004) and Mayda (2004), who examine the correlates of 
international migration flows.  In research on internal migration, there is considerable work on the incentive 
to migrate.  See Greenwood (1997) and Lucas (1997) for reviews of the literature.   3 
communicate  changes  in  their  demand  for  labor  to  prospective  migrants  in  Mexico.  
Migrants use these same networks to find jobs and housing in the United States.  Shocks 
to either the Mexico or U.S. economies may be transmitted into changes in cross-border 
labor flows with  relatively short time lags, making illegal migration potentially quite 
responsive to changes in binational business-cycle conditions. 
 
  Another  feature  that  distinguishes  legal  and  illegal  migrant  flows  is  their 
composition.  While legal migrants face entry costs associated with queues in obtaining 
visas, illegal migrants face costs associated with evading immigration authorities.  Once 
in the receiving country, the risk of detection may make some employers unwilling to 
hire illegal migrants, limiting their occupational prospects and reducing the returns to 
skill they perceive.  Variation in migration costs and in receiving-country wage profiles 
between legal and illegal migration suggest the characteristics of illegal migrants may 
differ  from  those  of  legal  migrants.    Observed  changes  in  the  composition  of  U.S. 
immigrants,  which  has  received  much  attention  in  research  on  consequences  of  U.S. 
immigration, could be partly a by-product of the rising share of unauthorized entrants in 
immigrant inflows.  For Mexico, the composition of migrant outflows matters not just for 
the labor-market effects of emigration but also for the ties that migrants retain with the 
country.  Illegal migrants appear to be more likely than legal migrants to send remittances 
to  family  members  in  Mexico.    Rising  illegal  migration  from  Mexico  may  be partly 
responsible for the recent surge in remittances in the country, which rose from 0.1% of 
GDP in 1990 to 2.2% of GDP in 2004 and now generate more foreign exchange in the 
country than tourism or foreign direct investment (IADB, 2005). 
 
  In  this  paper,  I  selectively  review  recent  literature  on  illegal  migration  from 
Mexico to the United States.  In section 2, I discuss methods for estimating stocks and 
flows of illegal migrants.  While there is uncertainty about the size of the unauthorized 
population, new data sources make it possible to examine the composition of legal and 
illegal populations and the time-series covariates of illegal labor flows.  In section 3, I 
consider the supply of and demand for illegal migrants.  Wage differentials between the 
United  States  and  Mexico  are  hardly  a  new  phenomenon,  yet  illegal  migration  from 
Mexico  did  not  reach  high  levels  until  recently.    An  increase  in  the  relative  size  of 
Mexico’s working-age population, greater volatility in U.S.-Mexico relative wages, and 
changes in U.S. immigration policies are all candidate explanations for increasing labor 
flows from Mexico.  In section 4, I consider policies that regulate the cross-border flow 
of illegal migrants.  While U.S. laws mandate that authorities prevent illegal entry and 
punish firms that hire unauthorized immigrants, these laws are imperfectly enforced.  Lax 
enforcement may reflect political pressure by employers and other interests that favor 
open borders.  In section 5, I discuss directions for further research. 
   
  My goal in this paper is not to conduct an exhaustive survey of work on illegal 
migration  but  rather  to  highlight  major  findings  in  the  literature,  assess  the  state  of 
important  debates,  and  identify  unresolved  issues,  with  an  eye  toward  advancing 
questions to help guide future work.  As much of the literature is empirical, I will focus 
on this strand of research, with occasional forays into theory.  One topic I will not discuss 
at  much  length  is  the  economic  consequences  of  illegal  migration,  in  part  because   4 
literature on the consequences of immigration has been subject to several recent surveys 
(see note 6) and in part because there is little research on the specific aspects of these 
consequences that are attributable to illegal immigration. 
 
  Though my focus is on the United States and Mexico, insights from the literature 
are relevant for other regions, as well.  Unauthorized migration has become a global 
phenomenon.  In the last two decades, there have been sizable flows of illegal migrants 
from North Africa and Eastern Europe to Western Europe, from Indonesia to elsewhere 
in Southeast Asia, and from neighboring countries to South Africa.  The U.S.-Mexico 
experience  may  be  instructive  for  these  and  other  cases  regarding  how  to  measure 
unauthorized migration, estimate the causes and consequences of migration flows, and 
gauge the potential impacts of policy interventions. 
 
 
2.  Stocks and Flows of Illegal Migrants 
 
  Illegal immigrants account for a large and growing fraction of the U.S. foreign-
born  population.
8    One  may  imagine  that,  as  part  of  the  underground  economy, 
unauthorized migrants are not easily subject to measurement.  However, there is now 
abundant evidence that illegal immigrants are represented in official household surveys, 
including the U.S. Census of Population and Housing and the U.S. Current Population 
Survey.    Given  known  levels  of  U.S.  legal  immigration,  the  number  of  foreign-born 
individuals enumerated in these sources is far too large for them all to be legal. 
 
  The most common method to estimate the number of illegal immigrants is to take 
the difference between the measured immigrant population and the sum of past legal 
immigrant inflows.  Estimates using this residual approach suggest that stocks of illegal 
immigrants have risen sharply over time.  However, there is considerable variability in 
the estimates, associated with differing  assumptions about the magnitude of  errors in 
enumerating legal and illegal immigrants in official data sources. 
 
  Knowing the overall share of immigrants who are unauthorized is not the same as 
knowing which specific immigrants in a given data source are unauthorized.  Fortunately, 
there  are  now  several  micro-level  surveys  that  provide  information  on  individual 
migration status.  Either by design or default, migrants from Mexico account for a large 
fraction of those represented in these data sources.  While each survey has limitations, 
their use in conjunction with large public data sets from Mexico and the United States 
provides considerable detail on the population of legal and illegal migrants from Mexico 
who are living or have lived in the United States. 
 
  A  third  data  source  on  unauthorized  migration  is  a  by-product  of  U.S. 
immigration policy.  To prevent illegal immigration, the U.S. Border Patrol polices U.S. 
borders and ports of entry, attempting to apprehend those seeking to enter the country 
illegally.    The  Border  Patrol  compiles  high-frequency  data  on  apprehensions  and 
enforcement, the vast majority of which occur along the U.S.-Mexico border.  Data on 
                                                 
8 This also appears to be the case in Western Europe (Boeri, Hanson, and McCormick, 2002).   5 
border apprehensions and enforcement allow one to examine how attempts at illegal entry 
vary with economic conditions in the United States and Mexico and to see which factors 
are associated with the intensity of U.S. enforcement activities. 
 
2.1 The Residual Foreign-Born Population 
 
  In the United States, there are two classes of legal immigrants who appear in 
official data sources (i.e., are surveyed by the U.S. Census Bureau, the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, or other official entities).  One is permanent legal immigrants, who have 
the right to reside in the country indefinitely.  Another is temporary legal immigrants, 
who have the right to reside in the country for a defined time period, as specified by an 
entry visa (such as those for students, specific skill classes of workers, diplomats, and 
family  members  of  temporary  legal  immigrants).
9    Since  government  surveys  do  not 
screen individuals based on their immigration status, illegal immigrants also appear in 
official data, to the extent they make themselves available to be surveyed. 
 
  The standard method to estimate the number of illegal immigrants is to assume it 
is equal to the residual foreign-born population, which is given by 
 
        t
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where Ut is the unauthorized foreign-born population in year t, Ft is the total foreign-born 
population in year t, Ls is the number of permanent legal immigrants that entered in year 
s￿t, ms is the mortality rate between year s and year t for legal immigrants entering in 
year s, es is the emigration rate between year s and year t for legal immigrants entering in 
year s, and Tt is temporary legal immigrants present in year t. 
 
  Table 1 reports estimates of the unauthorized foreign-born population by the U.S. 
Bureau of the Census (Costanzo et al., 2003), Bean et al. (2001a, 2001b), Passel (2005), 
and  the  U.S.  Immigration  and  Naturalization  Service  (2001).
10    In  the  most  recent 
projection, Passel (2005) estimates that between 2002 and 2004 the illegal immigrant 
population rose from 9.3 to 10.3 million, for an average annual net inflow of 500,000 
migrants, with 57% of these individuals coming from Mexico.  This compares to an 
average annual net illegal inflow during the 1990-to-2000 period of 581,000 migrants 
(with 58% of net new immigrants coming from Mexico), based on U.S. Census Bureau 
estimates  (Costanzo  et  al.,  2001),  and  350,000  migrants  (with  79%  coming  from 
Mexico), based on INS (2001) estimates.   
 
  Obviously, there are a host of assumptions involved in estimating (1).  One must 
assign mortality and emigration rates to each entry cohort and determine the fraction of 
temporary immigrants admitted in previous years that are still in the country.  In practice, 
                                                 
9 The Census Bureau does not survey individuals on tourist or business visas or other short-term visitors. 
10 See Bean at al. (1998) for a survey of the literature on estimating illegal immigrant populations.   6 
most  discrepancies  evident  in  Table  1  appear  unrelated  to  differences  in  these 
assumptions.  Of greater importance are assumptions about measurement error in Ft.   
 
  To  simplify  matters,  I  re-express  equation  (1)  in  contemporaneous  values  as 
t t t U L F + = , where  Lt is the total legal foreign-born population in  year t. The U.S. 
Census Bureau (and other entities that conduct household surveys) tends to undercount 
the  total  population  (with  undercount  rates  for  low-income  households,  which  would 
include many Mexican immigrants, believed to be relatively high), in which case the 
measured foreign-born population,  t F
~
, is less than the actual foreign-born population, Ft.  
The total legal-immigrant population, Lt, in contrast, appears to be measured with greater 
accuracy,  since  immigration  authorities  have  records  on  how  many  entry  visas  they 
award.  Suppose the legal-immigrant population that is enumerated in the census is, 
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where ￿t is the fraction of legal immigrants that go uncounted, and the unauthorized-
immigrant population enumerated in the census is, 
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mean zero iid errors.  t L
~
 and  t U
~
 are not observed individually but are observed in terms 
of  their  sum,  t F
~
.  While  the  U.S.  Census  Bureau  estimates  that  it  undercounts  the 
Hispanic population by 5%, Bean et al. (2001b) put the undercount rate for legal Mexican 
immigrants at 2% to 4%.  Similarly, while the U.S. Census Bureau estimates that it 
undercounts the illegal immigrant population by 15%, the INS assumes an undercount of 
10%, and Bean et al. (2001) use undercount rates of 15% to 25%.  It is primarily these 
differences in assumptions that account for variation in the estimates in Table 1. 
 
  Assumptions about undercount rates are based on comparisons of the enumerated 
population  with  the  population  measured  in  post-enumeration  surveys  conducted  in 
specific localities.  This requires one to assume that under-enumeration in these localities 
is representative of the total U.S. population (see Bean et al. 1998).  The U.S. Census 
Bureau  justifies  its  undercount  assumptions  based  on  results  from  its  own  post-
enumeration surveys, from which standard errors for population estimates are derived 
(Costanzo et al., 2001).  The INS (2001) justifies a 10% undercount rate based on a case 
study of Mexican immigrants in Los Angeles County.  Bean et al. (2001a, 2001b) justify 
their range of undercount rates based on results in Van Hook and Bean (1998). 
 
  Given observed values of  t F
~
 and Lt and assumed values for ￿t or ￿t, which I 
indicate by a tilde, the estimated value of the illegal-immigrant population in year t can 
be approximated as  
   7 
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If true undercount rates fall over time and we fail to account for this, estimates of the 
illegal-migration population will be biased upwards ( t t U U ˆ > ).
11  Consider values for  t F
~
 
and Lt in 1996 and 2001 in Bean et al. (2001a, 2001b).  If we change the assumption for 
the 1996-2001 period from a constant illegal undercount rate of 25% (which is at the 
upper end of the Bean et al. rates) to a reduction in the illegal undercount rate from 25% 
to 15% (to the lower end of the Bean et al. rates),
12 the estimated annual illegal net inflow 
from Mexico would fall by 112,000 migrants (from 432,000 to 320,000), which is 30% of 
the average annual estimated illegal inflow over the period.  Since different authors tend 
to use different post-enumeration surveys as the basis for selecting undercount rates, 
there is little consensus in the literature about what has happened to the undercount of 
illegal immigrants over time, other than it exhibiting a downward trend. 
 
  In  Table  1,  the  span  of  estimates  for  the  illegal-immigrant  population  in  the 
United States is wide.  Between 1990 and 2004, the estimated average annual net inflow 
of unauthorized immigrants ranges from 350,000 to 580,000 individuals, with 55% to 
80% of these individuals coming from Mexico.  Missing in the literature are attempts to 
gauge how the validity of different assumptions about undercount rates vary across time.  
The post-enumeration surveys (typically conducted by or on behalf of the U.S. Census 
Bureau or BLS) that are the basis for the undercount assumptions are carried out in a 
small number of communities around the time of the main survey.  Since samples for 
post-enumeration surveys differ across survey periods, there is little basis for making 
time-series comparisons in undercount rates.  Until large-scale public surveys ask about 
individual  migration  status  directly,  estimating  the  size  of  the  illegal-immigrant 
population will remain a speculative enterprise. 
 
2.2 Churning in Legal and Illegal Immigrant Populations 
 
  Estimates of the stock of illegal immigrants give little indication of how long 
unauthorized migrants are likely to remain without a legal resident visa.  Each year, there 
appears to be a large flow of individuals from the pool of illegal migrants to the pool of 
permanent legal immigrants.  Many immigrants who obtain visas for legal permanent 
residence (green cards) are at the time they obtain their visas residing in the United States 
illegally.  Figure 2 shows the number of Mexican immigrants awarded legal permanent 
residence and the fraction of these individuals who are adjusting status.  Over the period 
1992-2002, status adjusters accounted for 56% of new legal permanent immigrants from 
Mexico.  Some of those adjusting their visa status are temporary legal immigrants who 
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When the assumed undercount rate for illegal immigrants is low, this expression will be negative (there will 
be upward bias in the estimated number of illegal immigrants).  This effect will be exaggerated if the 
assumed undercount rate for legal immigrants is also low. 
12 In this exercise, I assume the undercount rate for legal migrants is held constant at 2%.   8 
have succeeded in obtaining permanent entry visas.  However, for Mexican immigrants, 
the majority of those adjusting status to permanent legal residence appear to have been 
living in the United States as illegal immigrants (DHS, 2004).   
 
  Further evidence of churning in the population of legal and illegal immigrants is 
available in the New Immigrant Survey (NIS), which in its pilot form includes a random 
sample of 1,134 immigrants who received U.S. legal permanent resident visas in 1996 
(Jasso, Massey, Rosenzweig, and Smith, 2000).  Based on the NIS data, Massey and 
Malone (2002) find that 54% of Mexican nationals who obtained a green card in 1996 
reported having entered the United States illegally at an earlier date in time, either by 
crossing the U.S. border (41%) or overstaying a temporary entry visa (13%).  Overall, 
21%  of  U.S.  green-card  recipients  in  1996  reported  having  crossed  the  U.S.  border 
illegally and 11% reported having overstayed a temporary entry visa. 
 
  Transitions from illegal to legal residence status indicate that many individuals 
queuing for U.S. green cards choose to do so as illegal immigrants, rather than waiting 
out the process as residents of their home countries.  Between 1992 and 2004, 90% of 
Mexican immigrants who obtained U.S. green cards qualified under family-reunification 
provisions  of  U.S.  immigration  law.    Since  1965,  the  United  States  has  granted 
unrestricted legal entry to the immediate relatives of U.S. citizens and restricted legal 
entry, subject to annual immigration quotas, to more distant relatives of U.S. citizens and 
relatives of U.S. permanent legal residents.  Most applicants take several years or more to 
clear the queue for a green card.
13  While the United States periodically attempts to limit 
the granting of green cards to those applicants who either have valid temporary entry 
visas or are residing abroad, the sheer volume of applications has made this provision 
difficult  to  enforce  (Vaughan,  2003).    Consequently,  the  U.S.  government  routinely 
grants  green  cards  to  individuals  who  currently  are  residing  in  the  country  illegally.  
Massey and Malone (2002) report that prior illegality is more common among those who 
receive green cards under family-based immigration provisions than under employment-
based  immigration  provisions.    The  latter  category  requires  sponsorship  by  a  U.S. 
employer and applies mostly to highly skilled individuals. 
 
  Churning  in  the  illegal  immigrant  population  suggests  some  unauthorized 
migrants may view their visa status as mutable.  In making the decision to migrate to the 
United States, individuals in Mexico who have relatives that are U.S. legal residents may 
internalize the prospect of obtaining a U.S. green card in the future.   They may consider 
being an illegal immigrant as simply an intermediate step in becoming a legal permanent 
resident.  The possibility of transitioning from illegal to legal status may blur differences 
in the expectations and behavior of legal and illegal migrants.   
 
                                                 
13 Though immediate relatives of U.S. citizens are not subject to immigration quotas, to obtain a green card 
they still must screened by immigration authorities, a process that can take as long as two years.  The 
screening process is more protracted for individuals who meet the qualifications for a green card but whose 
preference  category  is  subject  to  immigration  quotas  (e.g.,  more  distant  relatives  of  U.S.  citizens  and 
relatives of U.S. legal residents) and can take five years or more (Martin, 2005).    9 
  A second means by which prospective migrants might expect to obtain a U.S. 
green card is through a future amnesty for illegal aliens.  In 1986, the U.S. Immigration 
Reform  and  Control  Act  (IRCA)  awarded  permanent  legal  residence  visas  to  illegal 
immigrants who could demonstrate either (i) continuous U.S. residence since 1982, or (ii) 
60 days of employment in U.S. agriculture since 1985.  Over the next eight years, 1.6 
million illegal immigrants received green cards under the first provision and 1.1 million 
illegal  agricultural  workers  received  green  cards  under  the  second  provision,  with 
Mexican nationals accounting for 2 million of the 2.7 million IRCA legalizations (INS, 
1996).  While there is political opposition in the United States to another amnesty, there 
have been numerous recent legislative proposals to legalize at least some unauthorized 
migrants (Hanson, 2005).  The prospect of a future amnesty is another factor that helps 
diminish distinctions between legal and illegal migrants. 
 
2.3 Composition of the Legal and Illegal Immigrant Populations 
   
  A longstanding conception of Mexico-to-U.S. migration is that it is driven by the 
needs and rhythms of agriculture.  According to this view, most migrants from Mexico 
are from the countryside, come to the United States to work as farm laborers during peak 
agricultural months, and return to their families in Mexico for the winter off-season.  
Migrants would tend to be male, rural in origin, relatively uneducated, and residing in the 
United States on an itinerant basis.  While there is little doubt that at one time this view 
of Mexican migration was accurate, the Mexican immigrant population in the United 
States has since become more heterogeneous and more permanent. 
 
  Large-scale emigration from Mexico began in the early 20
th century.  Railroad 
construction in the late 1800s linked interior Mexico to the U.S. border, giving U.S. 
employers  improved  access  to  Mexican  labor  (Cardoso,  1980).    In  the  early  1900’s, 
Texas farmers began to recruit laborers in Mexico.  They followed the main rail line into 
the  country,  which  ran  southwest  through  agricultural  states  in  Mexico’s  central  and 
western regions.  Early migrants from Mexico came primarily from nine Mexican states 
in this area (Durand, Massey, and Zenteno, 2001).
14  Migration expanded further in the 
1940s, after the U.S. Congress enacted the Bracero Program (1942-1964), which allowed 
U.S. employers to bring in workers from Mexico (and the Caribbean) to fulfill short-term 
labor contracts (of less than a year in length).  At the end of their contracts, workers were 
required to return to their home countries.  The vast majority of braceros worked on U.S. 
farms (Calavita, 1992).  At its peak, from 1954 to 1960, 300,000 to 450,000 migrant 
workers  from  Mexico  entered  the  United  States  annually.    The  end  of  the  Bracero 
Program marked the beginning of large-scale illegal immigration from Mexico.
15 
 
  After working in the United States, many braceros returned to Mexico where they 
assisted later generations in migrating abroad.  They helped establish informal networks 
through which earlier migrants help new migrants enter the United States, find housing in 
                                                 
14 These nine states are Aguascalientes, Colima, Durango, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacán, Nayarit, San 
Luis Potosí, and Zacatecas.  During the period 1944 to 1964, this group of states accounted for 55% of 
migration from Mexico to the United States (Durand, Massey, and Zenteno, 2001). 
15 On illegal immigration and guest-worker programs, see Epstein, Hillman, and Weiss (1999).   10 
U.S.  cities,  and  obtain  jobs  with  U.S.  employers.    Networks  are  often  embedded  in 
relationships involving family, kin, or community of birth, which gives them a regional 
component.  Partly as a result, there is strong historical persistence in migration rates to 
the United States across Mexican regions.  Figure 3 plots emigration rates in the 1950s 
against  those  in  the  1990s  across  Mexico’s  32  states.    Data  for  the  1950s  are  from 
Woodruff  and  Zenteno  (2001),  who  calculate  the  fraction  of  each  Mexican  state’s 
population that migrated to the United States between 1955 and 1959 under the U.S. 
Bracero Program.  Data for the 1990s, taken from the 2000 Mexico Census of Population 
and Housing, report the fraction of households in a state having a member migrate to the 
United States between 1995 and 2000.  The correlation between state migration rates in 
the 1995-2000 and the 1955-59 periods is 0.73.  Figure 4 shows that most high-migration 
states are located in central Mexico, which is neither close to the United States nor home 
to Mexico’s poorest households.  States on the U.S.-Mexico border tend to have low 
emigration rates, as do states in low-income southern Mexico. 
 
  Perhaps  as  a  result  of  migration  networks,  current  generations  of  Mexican 
immigrants in the United States tend to live near individuals from their home regions in 
Mexico.  For instance, Munshi (2003) finds that immigrants from the state of Jalisco are 
much more likely to live in Los Angeles or San Diego than immigrants from the state of 
Guanajuato, who prefer Chicago or Dallas.  Migrants  reinforce networks by creating 
home-town associations that help members of their communities in Mexico make the 
transition  to  living  north  of  the  border.    Of  218  home-town  associations  formed  by 
Mexican  immigrants  enumerated  in  a  2002  survey  of  such  organizations  in  southern 
California, 87% were associated with one of the nine west-central states that dominated 
migration to the United States under the Bracero Program (Cano, 2004).   
 
  While migration networks are a consistent feature of cross-border labor flows, the 
composition of these flows is not.  Since the 1960s, Mexico has urbanized, become a 
more educated nation, and incorporated women into the labor force in greater numbers.  
Cornelius (1992) and Cornelius and Marcelli (2001) suggest these changes have shifted 
the composition of Mexican migrants in the United States from sojourners, who follow 
the harvest season through the rural United States and then return to Mexico at the end of 
the year, to settlers, who have a permanent presence in U.S. communities.  Resisting this 
notion, Durand, Massey, and Zenteno (2001) suggest instead that migration to the United 
States  remains  dominated  by  men  from  traditionally  agricultural  states  in  Western 
Mexico.  While migrants have become better educated and more urban, they retain strong 
ties to Mexico, returning often and tending to avoid permanent U.S. settlement. 
 
  Until recently, it would have been difficult to muster much more than case-study 
evidence to evaluate these claims.  There are now several data sources on migrants from 
Mexico that give details on an individual’s migration status.
16  Perhaps the best known 
                                                 
16  A  similar  source  is  the  National  Survey  of  Demographic  Dynamics  (ENADID),  conducted  by  the 
government of Mexico in 1992 and 1997.  The ENADID asks households in Mexico whether any of its 
members have ever worked in or looked for work in the United States (and the year in which this occurred).  
In the 1997 ENADID, 9% of individuals report having been to the United States and 21% of households 
report having a member in the United States, up from 8% and 17% in 1992.  As with the MMP, the   11 
and most utilized source is the Mexican Migration Project (MMP).
17  The MMP is a 
household survey conducted in winter months (when seasonal migrants tend to return to 
Mexico) in 1982 and over the period 1987 to 1997 in several dozen rural communities in 
western Mexico, chosen for having high rates of migration to the United States (Massey 
et  al.,  1994;  Durand  et  al.,  1996).    In  each  community  and  in  each  year,  the  MMP 
surveyed a random sample of several hundred households, collecting information on past 
migration behavior of each household member.
18  An advantage of the MMP is that it 
allows one to construct retrospective migration histories on a reasonably large sample of 
individuals.
19  Among male household heads, 23% report having migrated to the United 
States within three years of being surveyed (during the period 1984 to 1996).  Of those 
reporting having migrated over the period 1970 to 1990, 89% state that on their first trip 
to the United States they entered without documents (McKenzie and Rapoport, 2004).   
 
  The MMP is subject to several potential problems associated with how migrants 
and communities are selected into the sample.  Since communities included in the MMP 
are  chosen  on  the  basis  of  being  rural  and  having  residents  with  high  migration 
propensities, they are unlikely to be representative of Mexico as a whole (McKenzie and 
Rapoport, 2004).  Within communities, the households surveyed are those with at least 
one member remaining in Mexico, thus excluding households that have migrated to the 
United States in their entirety.  And, within households, the migrants surveyed directly 
are those who have returned to Mexico, for at least part of the year.  There are no direct 
observations on individuals residing in the United States. 
 
  One way to evaluate the issue of sample selection in the MMP is to compare 
individuals in the survey with individuals in Mexico’s Census of Population and Housing 
and with Mexican immigrants in the U.S. Census of Population and Housing.  Table 2 
gives summary statistics for working-age adults in the 1990 U.S. and Mexico censuses 
and in the 1989, 1990, and 1991 MMP surveys.  I consider three MMP subsamples: (a) 
all respondents, (b) those who report residing in the United States but who are present in 
Mexico at the time of the MMP survey (seasonal migrants), and (c) those in the United 
States  at  the  time  of  the  MMP  survey  (permanent  migrants),  whose  responses  are 
provided by other members of their household in Mexico. 
 
  While Mexican immigrants in the United States (census immigrants) and MMP 
permanent migrants have relatively similar characteristics, they differ considerably from 
MMP seasonal migrants.  Males account for 65% of MMP seasonal migrants, but only 
56% of census immigrants and MMP permanent immigrants.  And, while age profiles are 
similar among the three groups, educational attainment is not.  Males with nine or more 
years of schooling account for 52% of census immigrants and 48% of MMP permanent 
                                                                                                                                                 
ENADID only includes households with at least one member remaining in Mexico.  See Durand, Massey, 
and Zenteno (2001) and McKenzie and Rapoport (2004) for work using the ENADID and Cornelius and 
Marcelli (2001) and Durand, Massey and Zenteno (2001) for discussions of other surveys. 
17 Recent papers using the MMP include Massey and Espinosa (1997), Reyes (1997), Munshi (2003), 
Gathmann (2004), Orrenius and Zavodny (2004), and McKenzie and Rapoport (2004). 
18 Different households are surveyed in different years, such that the MMP is a repeated cross-sections of 
households and not a true panel. 
19 On measurement error in retrospective data, see Beckett et al. (2001) and Smith and Thomas (2003).    12 
migrants, but only 31% of MMP seasonal migrants.  Employment patterns also differ 
across groups.  Among males, 16% of census immigrants and 9% of MMP permanent 
migrants work in agriculture, compared to 31% of MMP seasonal migrants.  Seasonal 
migrants also appear to be less established in the United States.  For males, 55% of MMP 
seasonal migrants have spent more than five years in the United States, compared to 71% 
census  immigrants  and  63%  of  MMP  permanent  migrants.    For  each  of  these 
comparisons, results are similar for females. 
 
Over time, Mexican immigrants have shifted out of agriculture as a main industry 
of U.S. employment.  Using data from the U.S. census, Card and Lewis (2005) show that 
between  1990  and  2000  among  recent  Mexican  immigrants  (0-5  years  in  the  United 
States) the share working in agriculture fell from 23% to 15% for men and from 13% to 
7%  for  women.    Among  men,  construction  accounted  for  the  largest  growth  in 
employment shares, while among women retail trade showed the largest increase. 
 
  Other surveys of illegal immigrants from Mexico also suggest their characteristics 
are more similar to permanent migrants (whether in the U.S. census or the MMP) than 
seasonal migrants.  The Legalized Persons Survey (LPS) covered illegal immigrants who 
were granted permanent legal residence in the United States under the amnesty provision 
of IRCA (eligibility for which required proof of U.S. residence from 1982 forward).  The 
LPS consisted of an initial survey in 1989 and a follow-up survey in 1992 of immigrants 
qualifying for legalization.
20  Among working-age adults in the LPS, shown in Table 2, 
57% of Mexican immigrants are male, 37% had nine or more years of schooling, and 
12% worked in agriculture.   
 
  In sum, data sources that include illegal immigrants are  almost  by  definition 
subject to sample-selection problems.  Official sources, such as the population census, are 
likely to undersample illegal immigrants, given their tendency to undercount low-income 
households.  Surveys that specifically target illegal immigrants, such as the MMP or the 
LPS, explicitly select respondents on the basis of observed characteristics (e.g., residence 
in  a  high-migration  community,  eligibility  for  an  amnesty).    Yet,  despite  conflicting 
selection criteria, available data sources paint a consistent picture of Mexican immigrants 
in  the  United  States,  suggesting  they  include  a  high  proportion  of  women,  are 
overwhelmingly  employed outside agriculture,  have high  education levels (relative to 
non-migrants in Mexico), and have established a long-term U.S. presence. 
 
  One data source that is inconsistent with this conclusion is the MMP sample of 
seasonal migrants – individuals who reside in the United States but return to Mexico in 
the winter months.  Since MMP seasonal migrants are selected on the basis of having 
returned to Mexico, it is hardly surprising that they fit the profile of itinerant migrant 
laborers.    Relative  to  other  samples  of  legal  and  illegal  immigrants,  MMP  seasonal 
migrants are disproportionately male, uneducated, and agricultural.  While much of the 
literature  based  on  the  MMP  uses  the  information  on  seasonal  migrants  to  examine 
                                                 
20 The initial survey was of 6,193 respondents, of whom 5,691 had received amnesty by 1992 (with most of 
the rest awaiting decision).  Of those granted amnesty, 82% were located for the follow-up interview.  The 
LPS sample excluded those granted amnesty under the Special Agricultural Worker provision of IRCA.   13 
Mexico-to-U.S. migration, this sample appears unrepresentative of Mexican immigrants 
in the United States.  When examining results using the MMP one should be mindful that 
they may apply only to seasonal migrants who return to Mexico with high frequency and 
not to the general population of Mexican migrants. 
   
2.4 Attempted Illegal Immigration 
 
  The majority of unauthorized immigrants from Mexico enter the United States by 
crossing the U.S.-Mexico border illegally.
21  The U.S. government devotes vast resources 
to policing U.S. borders, airports, and ports of  entry.   Between 1980 and 2004, real 
expenditure on border enforcement increased by over six times and in 2005 will equal 
$2.2 billion (Hanson, 2005b).  U.S. border-enforcement activities provide a glimpse into 
the high-frequency properties of illegal immigration.  The first line of defense against 
unauthorized entry is the U.S. Border Patrol.  Border Patrol officers on “linewatch” duty 
patrol the border, maintain electronic surveillance of major crossing points along the 
border, and staff traffic checkpoints along major highways near the border.  Figure 5 
shows annual Border Patrol officer hours devoted to linewatch duty from 1964 to 2003.  
Officer hours increased dramatically in the 1990s, rising from 2.5 million in 1994 to 9.8 
million in 2001.  This increase was due primarily to stepped up enforcement efforts at 
urban crossing points in California and Texas. 
 
  Concurrent with increased enforcement, apprehensions of those attempting illegal 
entry have increased, rising from 280,000 a year during the 1970s to 930,000 a year 
during the 1990s.  Individuals apprehended by Border Patrol officers on linewatch duty 
are typically captured while trying to enter the United States or just after entering the 
country.  Linewatch apprehensions are thus correlated with the contemporaneous level of 
attempted illegal immigration.
22  However, apprehensions are likely to be a poor indicator 
of the actual level of illegal inflows (Espenshade, 1995).  Within a single month, one 
individual may  be  apprehended multiple times.  Those apprehended who agree to be 
deported voluntarily are not processed by the U.S. justice system.  For Mexican nationals, 
voluntary deportation often involves little more than a bus ride across the border, leaving 
them in position to attempt illegal entry again in the near future.
23, 24   
 
  To gauge how apprehensions might be related to illegal immigration, consider the 
level of apprehensions as a function of the average probability of apprehension and the 
number of attempts at illegal entry.  Extending Ethier’s (1986) model, let 
 
        t t t t M ) M , H ( P A = ,          (5) 
                                                 
21 A second strategy, less common among Mexican immigrants but more common among those from other 
countries, is to enter the United States on a temporary visa and then remain in the country after it expires. 
22 Individuals apprehended in the U.S. interior, in contrast, could have crossed the border at a much earlier 
date, making interior apprehensions less strongly correlated with current attempts at illegal entry. 
23 Between 1990 and 2003, 95% of those the Border Patrol apprehended agreed to depart voluntarily. 
24 A further issue is that the majority of those attempting illegal entry do not appear to be apprehended on 
any given attempt.  Using MMP data, Massey and Singer (1995) find that for trips to the United States in 
the 1970s and 1980s the average probability of apprehension was 35%.   14 
 
where At is the level of apprehensions, Mt is the number of attempts at illegal entry, and 
P(Ht,Mt) is the average probability an individual is apprehended on any given attempt to 
cross the border.  The apprehensions probability is a function of Ht, the intensity with 
which  authorities  police  the  border,  and  the  number  of  entry  attempts.    Greater 
enforcement is likely to raise the apprehension probability, making P(￿) increasing in Ht.  
For a given level of enforcement, more total attempts are likely to reduce the probability 
any single attempt results in capture (since enforcement resources are spread more thinly 
across those attempting entry), making P(￿) decreasing in Mt.
 25   
 
  Suppose  2 1
t t t t M cH ) M , H ( P
a - a = , where c, ￿1, and ￿2 are positive constants, in 
which case log apprehensions can be expressed as 
 
      t 2 t 1 0 t M ln ) 1 ( H ln A ln a - + a + a =       (6) 
 
Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999) use monthly data over the period 1968-1996 to estimate 
equation (6), modeling attempted illegal entry as a reduced-form function of real wages 
in Mexico, real wages in the United States, other indicators of economic conditions in the 
two countries, a time trend and monthly dummy variables.
26  With an estimate of ￿1, we 
can solve for a function that is an affine transformation of lnMt, given by,   
 
 
      t 1 t t 2 0 H ln A ln M ln ) 1 ( a - = a - + a       (7) 
 
The expression on the right of (7) will positively covary with lnMt as long as ￿2 < 1.  
Approximated attempts at illegal entry in (7) do not give an estimate of the level of illegal 
immigration.  However, they may indicate the variation across time and the magnitude of 
log changes in attempted illegal entry.   
 
  Figure  6  shows  estimates  of  (7),  based  on  instrumental-variables  estimates  of 
equation (6) (see note 26).  Approximated attempts at illegal entry rise from the 1960s to 
the  mid  1980s,  are  stable  from  the  mid  1980s  to  the  mid  1990s,  and  then  decline 
somewhat in 2000 and 2001.  Part of the 2001 decline may reflect a change in border-
crossing activity after the events of September 11
th in the United States.  In late 2001, the 
U.S. Border Patrol increased its vigilance at border crossings, which may have dissuaded 
some migrants from crossing as frequently as they had in the past.
27 
 
                                                 
25 For earlier work using apprehensions data, see Bean, et al. (1990) and Borjas, Freeman, and Lang (1991). 
26 To deal with the possible correlation between enforcement and unobserved shocks to apprehensions, 
Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999) instrument for enforcement using U.S. government spending on national 
defense and indicators for whether there is an upcoming U.S. presidential, congressional, or border-state 
gubernatorial election.  Border enforcement tends to follow a political cycle, dropping during election years 
(Hanson, Robertson, and Spilimbergo, 2001).  The reported coefficient estimate for ￿1 is the long-run 
elasticity of apprehensions with respect to enforcement. 
27 See Mary Jordan, "Mexicans Caught at Border in Falling Numbers," Washington Post, May 24, 2002.   15 
  The trend in Figure 6 is roughly consistent with Table 1 and results from previous 
estimates of the U.S. unauthorized population.  Illegal immigration appears to have risen 
steadily after the end of the Bracero Program in 1965 and has been relatively stable at 
high levels for the past two decades.
28  I will return to data on border apprehensions and 
enforcement when evaluating factors that affect the level of illegal immigration and the 




  Currently, no data source gives precise estimates of the size of the U.S. illegal-
immigrant  population  over  medium  or  long  time  spans.    Government  data-gathering 
agencies have been wary of asking questions about an individual’s immigration status, 
perhaps out of fear of dissuading illegal migrants from participating in surveys.  The 
result is gaps in our knowledge about unauthorized migrants, which the literature has 
been able to partially fill in through other data sources. 
 
  The perspective that emerges from the data that are available is that Mexico-to-
U.S. illegal migration increased in the 1970s and 1980s and averaged around 200,000 to 
300,000 net unauthorized entries per year in the 1990s and early 2000s.  The population 
of illegal immigrants from Mexico in the United States includes a substantial fraction of 
women, is predominantly employed in non-agricultural jobs, and has schooling levels 
that are comparable to or higher than non-migrating individuals in Mexico.  Though 
many migrants maintain ties with family members in their origin communities, a majority 
appear to have settled in the United States on a medium or long-term basis.  
 
 
3.  The Supply of and Demand for Mexican Immigrants 
 
  Beginning  with  Sjaastad  (1962),  economists  have  viewed  migration  as  an 
investment decision.  An individual migrates if the expected discounted difference in the 
stream of income between the new and old location exceeds moving costs.  The incentive to 
migrate will vary across individuals according to differences in their expectations of future 
earnings,  discount  rates,  and  perceived  cost  of  migrating.    The  cost  of  unauthorized 
migration includes transport to the border, the physical risks and monetary charges incurred 
in crossing the border illegally, the psychic penalty from leaving one’s friends and family 
behind, and the time and monetary expense of settling in another country.  To uncover 
sources of variation in the demand for and the supply of illegal migrants, recent work 
estimates  the  sensitivity  of  migrant  outflows  from  Mexico  to  variation  in  U.S.  and 
Mexican wages, border-crossing costs, and access to migration networks. 
 
  Also beginning with Sjaastad, economists tend to model the migration decision as 
irreversible (Greenwood, 1997; Lucas, 1997).  In many contexts, this assumption may be 
                                                 
28 One limitation of this exercise is that I assume border-crossing technology and border-apprehensions 
technology  have  been  stable  over  time.    There  is  anecdotal  evidence  that  both  may  have  changed 
considerably,  especially  since  September,  2001.    However,  Hanson  and  Spilimbergo  (1999)  find  no 
evidence of a structural break in the apprehensions function for the 1968 to 1996 period.   16 
reasonable.  U.S. legal immigrants, if they wish to keep their green cards valid, must make 
the United States their permanent residence.
29  Those migrating to the United States legally 
would thus tend to be individuals expecting to stay in the country for an extended period of 
time.  In the context of illegal migration from Mexico, individuals may operate on shorter 
time horizons.  The substantial round-trip migration documented by the Mexican Migration 
Project indicates that for at least some Mexican nationals the cost of moving back and forth 
across the border is sufficiently low to warrant making the trip annually. 
 
  Of interest to both Mexico and the United States is not just the volume of migrant 
flows but their composition.  Widening differences in earnings between immigrants and 
natives  in  the  United  States  is  cited  as  evidence  that  recent  U.S.  immigrants  are 
negatively selected in terms of skill (Borjas, 1999a).  Following this line of thought, one 
might expect negative selection to be especially strong among illegal immigrants.  Recent 
work  examines  migrant  selection  by  comparing  the  characteristics  of  Mexican 
immigrants in the United States with those of non-migrating individuals in Mexico. 
 
3.1 The Incentive to Migrate from Mexico to the United States 
 
  A  long  line  of  research  applies  the  general  framework  in  Sjaastad  (1962)  to 
examine  the  sensitivity  of  migration  flows  to  the  observed  costs  and  benefits  of 
migrating.    For  prospective  illegal  migrants  in  Mexico,  the  costs  include  the  four 
components identified above and the benefits include gains in real income associated 
with moving from low-wage Mexico to the high-wage United States.   
 
  First, consider the components of illegal migration costs.  Of these, transport costs to 
the border are likely to be small and psychic costs difficult to evaluate.  Border-crossing 
costs and settlement costs are in principle measurable, though it is only the former that has 
been subject to much in the way of formal research.  To avoid capture by the U.S. Border 
Patrol, migrants often purchase the services of a smuggler, known as a coyote.
30  Coyotes 
offer a range of services, from simply guiding migrants across the border to more complete 
packages that include transport to an interior U.S. city, such as Houston, Los Angeles, or 
Phoenix.
31  The MMP is one of the few data sources that asks migrants from Mexico about 
their border-crossing behavior.  Using MMP data, Orrenius (2001) documents that during 
                                                 
29 A green-card holder may lose U.S. permanent resident status by taking permanent residence abroad, 
remaining abroad without obtaining a re-entry visa, or by filing a foreign tax return as a non-immigrant.  
Once a legal immigrant becomes U.S. citizens, he or she is free to enter and leave the country at will. 
30 Coyotes also help migrants navigate unfamiliar terrain.  Recent changes in U.S. enforcement strategy 
have made it more difficult to cross the border in urban areas, encouraging migrants to enter the United 
States  through  the  mountainous  desert  regions  of  Arizona  and  Eastern  California,  where  temperature 
extremes expose migrants to physical risks.  Annual deaths of border crossers have increased from an 
average of 100 during the mid 1990s to 410 during the period 2000-2004 (Cornelius, 2005).  With net 
annual illegal immigration from Mexico since 2000 at approximately 300,000 individuals (see Table 1), 
there appear to be around 1.4 deaths per 1,000 successful net unauthorized migrants. 
31 For the more expensive, complete package of smuggling services, the coyote typically receives a portion 
of the fee up front and the remaining portion once the migrant is safely delivered to friends or family 
members in the United States.  See Charlie LeDuff, “The Crossing:  A Special Report; A Perilous 4,000 
Mile Passage to Work,” New York Times, May 29, 2001, p. 1.   17 
the period 1978 to 1996 69% of migrants reported hiring a coyote, as shown in Figure 7.
32  
During this period, the average price paid for coyote services varied between $385 and $715 
( in 2000 dollars).  Since 2001, when the Border Patrol became more vigilant in monitoring 
U.S. border crossing points, coyote prices have risen.  Based on a 2005 survey of return 
migrants in rural areas of two Mexican states (that are also in the MMP), Cornelius (2005) 
finds that between the 1996-1998 and 2002-2004 periods average coyote prices rose by 37% 
from $1180 to $1680.
33 
 
  One  might  be  concerned  that  coyote  prices  based  on  MMP  data  are  biased 
downwards.  As mentioned in the last section, the MMP surveys households in communities 
with high rates of migration to the United States.  Individuals in these communities may 
have relatively good access to migration networks, making them less dependent on coyote 
services or better able to negotiate lower prices from smugglers.  Cornelius (2005) reports 
that 65% of migrants hiring a smuggler in 2004 report using friends or family to find a 
coyote.  Results using the MMP itself are consistent with concerns about bias in observed 
coyote prices.  Gathmann (2004) finds that migrants with family members in the United 
States are less likely to use coyote services, and, among migrants who do hire a smuggler, 
those with family members abroad pay lower prices.  Yet, even if one accepts the high 
coyote prices quoted in the press,
34 border-crossing costs since 2001 appear to be no more 
than $2,000, which is 35% of Mexico’s 2003 per capita GDP. 
 
  Next, consider the benefits to migration.  To calculate the gross return to migration, 
one would need to account for the expected length of stay in the United States, the expected 
path of future earnings, and the discount rate applied to these earnings.  In the absence of 
data on these components, much of the research on the decision to migrate takes a reduced-
form  approach  to  modeling  how  the  returns  to  migration  affect  behavior.
35    Using 
retrospective data from the MMP, Orrenius and Zavodny (2005) estimate the hazard that 
young  males  migrate  to  the  United  States  as  a  function  of  individual  and  household 
characteristics and economic conditions in the two countries.
36  In the MMP, most migrants 
appear to be entering the United States illegally.  The migration hazard is non-monotonic in 
schooling, increasing at low and medium schooling levels (primary and secondary school) 
and decreasing at higher schooling levels (preparatory school and beyond).
37  The hazard is 
decreasing in per capita GDP in Mexico and increasing in U.S. average wages.  These 
results suggest that migrants tend to be drawn from the middle of the schooling distribution 
and that migration is more likely during periods when U.S. income is expanding relative to 
income in Mexico.  The migration hazard is also higher for individuals whose fathers have 
                                                 
32 To reduce recall bias, I only show data for years within four of years of an MMP survey. 
33 The increase in prices is based on respondents recollections in 2005 of prices they paid in previous years 
and thus may be subject to recall bias.  In 2005, 90% of respondents in Cornelius’ data (all of whom are 
from the states of Jalisco or Zacatecas) report using a coyote on their previous trip to the United States. 
34 Recent articles in the popular press give a price range for coyote services of $1,500 $2,000 (“Man 
Accused of Smuggling Immigrants,”  The Oregonian, September 17, 2005, p. B2; “US Immigration,” The 
Economist, May 19, 2005; “Between Here and There,” The Economist, July 5, 2001; “Illegal Immigration; 
Border Agents Understand a Complex Issue,” The San Diego Union-Tribune, May 26, 2005, p. B12).  
35 In earlier work, Taylor (1987) examines migration behavior in a single rural community in Mexico. 
36 See also Stark and Taylor (1989, 1991) and  Massey and Espinosa (1997).  
37 McKenzie and Rapoport (2004), who also use MMP data, obtain similar results.   18 
migrated or whose siblings have migrated.  This result could indicate the presence of family 
migration  networks,  or  it  could  indicate  the  presence  of  unobserved  household 
characteristics (e.g., unmeasured wealth) that influence migration behavior. 
 
  By  treating  migration  as  a  function  of  age,  education,  and  other  individual 
characteristics, Orrenius and Zavodny pick up variation across individuals in the incentive to 
migrate.  By also including macroeconomic conditions, they pick up time-series variation in 
the migration incentive.  Yet, since their specification is a reduced form, the coefficient 
estimates do  not  allow one  to  recover  the  elasticity  of  migration  with  respect  to  wage 
differentials between the United States and Mexico.  Further, since the MMP is restricted to 
communities with historically high propensities to migrate to the United States, the results 
may not be informative about how prospective migrants in other regions of Mexico respond 
to changes in binational economic conditions.  
 
  To  examine  how  the  gross  level  of  attempted  illegal  migration  responds  to 
changes  in  U.S.-Mexican  wages,  Hanson  and  Spilimbergo  (1999)  estimate  an 
apprehensions function, similar to that in equation (6).  Using monthly data, they regress 
apprehensions at the U.S.-Mexico border on lagged apprehensions, current and lagged 
linewatch enforcement  hours, the real peso wage for production workers in Mexican 
industry, real peso and real dollar U.S. wages (measured as the weighted average of wages 
in U.S. industries that employ recent Mexican immigrants in large numbers), and other 
controls.  They instrument for enforcement using U.S. government spending on national 
defense and indicators for whether there is an upcoming U.S. presidential, congressional, 
or border-state gubernatorial election (see note 26).  Figure 8 shows a partial regression 
plot of log apprehensions on log Mexican real average hourly earnings, based on Hanson 
and  Spilimbergo’s  estimates.    Border  apprehensions  appear  to  be  very  responsive  to 
changes in Mexican wages.  A 10% decline in Mexican real wages is associated with a 6-
8%  percent  increase  in  border  apprehensions.    Moreover,  this  effect  is  almost  fully 
realized within three months following a wage change, suggesting that shocks to the 
Mexican economy are rapidly transmitted to changes in attempted illegal migration.   
 
  Over  the  past  three  decades,  Mexico  has  experienced  wide  variation  in  real 
income, as periodic devaluations of the peso have lead to bursts of inflation, which have 
caused incomes to fall sharply.  Figure 9, which plots relative per capita GDP in the 
United  States  and  Mexico,  gives  evidence  of  this  volatility.    During  three  separate 
episodes in the last 30 years, Mexico’s per capita GDP declined by 5 log points or more 
(relative to the United States) within the space of three years.  Each of these episodes was 
followed by an increase in border apprehensions.  Much of the research on inter-regional 
migration in the United States and other countries finds that it is labor earnings in the 
receiving  region,  and  not  the  sending  region,  that  appear  to  drive  migration  flows 
(Greenwood, 1997).  However, this does not appear to be the case in Mexico, where 
income volatility appears to be a strong push factor for illegal migration. 
 
While  apprehensions  are  the  only  available  high-frequency  measure  of  gross 
attempts  at  illegal  migration,  these  data  have  important  limitations.    Since  individual 
migrants  may  be  apprehended  multiple  times  in  a  given  time  period,  the  number  of   19 
apprehensions  may  far  exceed  the  gross  number  of  migrants  (Espenshade,  1995).  
Controlling  for  border  enforcement  addresses  this  problem,  but  only  if  one  has  valid 
instruments for enforcement (since enforcement is likely to be endogenous to shocks to 
attempted illegal migration) and if the impact of enforcement on apprehensions (controlling 
for the incentive to migrate) is stable over time (see notes 26 and 28).   
 
3.2 U.S.-Mexico Wage Differences 
 
  The  reduced-form  results  of  Orrenius  and  Zavodny  (2005)  and  Hanson  and 
Spilimbergo (1999) suggest that illegal migration flows are highly responsive to changes in 
the return to migration.  However, these results give no indication of the magnitude of the 
returns themselves.  As a crude approximation of the short-run gross return to migration, I 
examine differences in hourly wages for men in Mexico and Mexican immigrant men in the 
United States in 2000.  I ask how long a migrant from Mexico would have to work in the 
United States in order to recoup border-crossing costs, as approximated by the price of 
coyote services.  I focus on males, since, as Table 2 shows, there are large differences in 
labor-force participation rates between women in Mexico and Mexican immigrant women in 
the United States, which complicates comparing female wage outcomes across national 
borders.  By limiting the analysis to current wage differences and a single component of 
migration costs, this exercise falls well short of a complete cost-benefit accounting of the 
migration decision.  Still, given large back and forth flows of labor across the U.S.-Mexico 
border, the current U.S.-Mexico wage differential is likely to be the relevant gross return to 
migration for at least some prospective migrants.   
 
  Table 3a reports average hourly earnings by age and schooling categories for males 
in  Mexico  (based  on  the  2000  Mexico  Census  of  Population  and  Housing)  and  for 
immigrant males from Mexico in the United States (based on the 2000 U.S. Census of 
Population and Housing).
38  To increase the share of illegal immigrants among Mexican 
immigrant men, I limit the sample to very recent immigrants (individuals residing in the 
United States for 0-3 years).  To adjust for cost of living differences between the countries, I 
scale  up  Mexican  hourly  wages  to  achieve  purchasing  power  parity  with  the  United 
States, using the 2000 PPP adjustment factor for Mexico in the Penn World Tables.
39 
 
Not surprisingly, wages are substantially higher among Mexican immigrants in the 
United States than among residents of Mexico.  For 23-27 year-old males the PPP-adjusted 
hourly wage differential varies from $7.01 for those with 0-4 years of schooling to $5.76 for 
those  with  13-15  years  of  schooling  and  to  $7.82  for  those  with  16  or  more  years  of 
schooling.  Given that migration propensities vary widely across regions of Mexico, one 
might think that the average hourly wage for the country as a whole may not be the relevant 
alternative wage for most prospective migrants.  Table 3b reports wage differentials between 
                                                 
38 For Mexico, average hourly wages are calculated as monthly labor income/(4.5*hours worked last week); 
for the U.S., average hourly wages are calculated as annual labor income/(weeks worked last year*usual 
hours worked per week).  For Mexico, I need to assume individuals work all weeks of a month, which 
could bias wage estimates downwards.  To avoid measurement error associated with implausibly low wage 
values or with top coding of earnings, I drop the largest and smallest 0.5% of wage values. 
39 In 2000, Mexico’s PPP-adjusted price level was 61% of the U.S. price level.   20 
the United and States and high-migration states in Mexico, defined to be states with above-
average  emigration  rates  in  2000.
40    U.S.-Mexico  wage  differentials  for  high-migration 
states are similar to those for Mexico as a whole. 
 
In Table 3b, the log binational wage difference declines with schooling, which is in 
line with empirical research that has suggested estimated returns to schooling are higher in 
Mexico.  In the 1990s in the United States, an additional year of schooling is associated 
with an increase in wages for Mexican immigrant men of 2.5 to 3.2 log points (Borjas, 
1996;  Trejo,  1997;  Grogger  and  Trejo,  2002).    In  1990s  in  Mexico,  in  contrast,  an 
additional year of schooling is associated with an increase in wages for men of 7.6 to 9.7 
log points (Chiquiar, 2003).
41  Returns to experience also appear to be higher for Mexican 
residents  than  for  Mexican  immigrants.    Higher  returns  to  education  in  Mexico  are 
consistent with the country having a low relative supply of skilled labor compared to the 
United States.  Higher average wages in the United States (within schooling groups) are 
consistent with the country having a higher relative level of TFP and higher relative 
supplies of physical capital. 
 
  In 2000, a 23-27 year-old recent Mexican migrant with 5 to 8 years of schooling 
(the category just below the national mean level of schooling for Mexico) would recoup 
border-crossing costs of $2,000 in 313 hours, or 7.8 weeks based on a 40-hour work 
week.    The  speed  with  which  migrants  would  seem  to  recover  border-crossing  costs 
suggests  that  other  costs  to  migration  (including  psychic  costs  and  financing  costs 
associated with credit constraints) are large.  In a simple static model, the equilibrium 
wage  differential  between  two  countries  is  fixed  by  migration  costs.    To  reconcile 
persistent U.S.-Mexico wage differences with small border-crossing costs, there would 
need to be positive unobserved migration costs (otherwise migration flows would be 
larger) and heterogeneity across individuals in these costs (otherwise migration flows 
would be lumpier, with either everyone or no one in a skill group willing to migrate). 
 
  There are reasons to be skeptical about how well the observed U.S.-Mexico wage 
differential  captures  the  incentive  to  migrate.    This  differential  reflects  the  binational 
difference  in  returns  to  both  observed  and  unobserved  characteristics.    If  migrants  are 
positively selected in terms of unobserved skill, observed wage differences will tend to 
overstate true wage differences.  In the next section, we address the issue of which types of 
individuals in Mexico select into migration.   
 
  Another issue is that, since average wages for Mexican immigrants in the United 
States are a composite of wages for legal and illegal immigrants, they may overstate wages 
an  illegal  immigrant  would  expect  to  earn.    Kossoudji  and  Cobb-Clark (2001)  use  the 
Legalized Persons Survey (LPS) to compare wages for illegal immigrants before and after 
they obtained green cards under the amnesty provision of the 1986 Immigration Reform and 
                                                 
40 These states are Aguascalientes, Colima, Durango, Guanajuato, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Jalisco, Michoacan, 
Morelos, Nayarit, Oaxaca, San Luis Potosi, and Zacatecas. 
41 On the returns to education in Mexico, see also Cragg and Epelbaum (1996) and Ariola and Juhn (2003).  
If unobserved ability and schooling are correlated, estimates of returns to schooling may be biased.  Also, 
self-selection into the labor force or into migration may introduce further biases.   21 
Control  Act.    Between  1989  and  1992,  average  hourly  earnings  for  newly  legalized 
immigrant men (64% of whom were Mexican nationals) rose by 6 log points relative to 
earnings for Latino men in the NLSY, controlling for observable characteristics.  Also, prior 
to legalization, illegal-immigrant men had relatively slow wage growth.  Not surprisingly, 
illegal  status  is  associated  with  lower  wages  and  less  opportunity  for  occupational 
advancement (Koussoudji and Cobb-Clark, 1996 and 2000).
42   
 
  What is surprising, perhaps, is that the estimated wage premium for legalization is so 
small.    One  might  expect  that  being  confined  to  the  underground  economy  would 
substantially  limit  workers’  employment  prospects.    Once  legalized,  they  would  enjoy 
strong wage growth.  By this reasoning, a 6-log-point gain over three years is unimpressive.  
One possibility is that the three years covered by the LPS is not long enough for individuals 
to realize the wage benefits associated with gaining legal status.  Legalization may open up 
new opportunities to move between occupations or between regions, which migrants need 
more time to exploit.  Another possibility is that Koussoudji and Cobb-Clark’s estimate is 
biased downwards.  Their control group includes legal and illegal immigrants from Latin 
America, as well as second and later generation Latin American immigrants.  Suppose 
illegal immigrants are more negatively selected in terms of unobserved skill than legal 
immigrants (where overall legal immigrants may be positively or negatively selected in 
terms of skill).  In an economy where the return to skill is rising (as in the United States 
during the 1990s), stronger negative selection of illegal immigrants in terms of unobserved 
skill would tend to make their unobserved wage growth relatively small and lead one to 
underestimate the wage premium due to legalization.   
 
  The differential in U.S. and Mexican wages in Table 3b may also miss important 
sources of variation across individuals in the incentive to migrate.  For instance, average 
wages for Mexican immigrants in the United States may hide heterogeneity in expectations 
about U.S. wages among prospective migrants.  Individuals with previous U.S. labor-market 
experience or who speak English well might have relatively strong wage expectations due to 
the ease with which they expect to find a U.S. job or the high productivity they anticipate 
having on the job.  Though not specific to Mexico, Bleakley and Chin (2004) find that, for 
immigrants  from  non-English-speaking  countries  that  arrived  in  the  United  States  as 
children, wages are higher for those with stronger English-language skills.
43   
 
  Another source of heterogeneity in wage expectations among prospective migrants 
is variation in access to migration networks.  Individuals with friends or family that have 
migrated abroad may have better information about how to find a job in the United States.  
Munshi (2003), using data from the MMP, finds that Mexican migrants in the United 
States are more likely to be employed and more likely to be employed in a (higher-
paying) nonagricultural job the larger is the U.S. population of residents from their origin 
community in Mexico.
44  He instruments for the time-varying size of the U.S. population 
                                                 
42 Rivera-Batiz (1999), who also uses the LPS, estimates larger wage differences between legal and illegal 
immigrants.  For other work on the wage consequences of IRCA, see Bansak and Raphael (2001). 
43 Bleakley and Chin (2004) instrument for English-language ability using immigrant age at arrival, exploiting 
the fact that younger children appear to learn new languages more easily than older children. 
44 For other work on migration networks in Mexico, see Winters, de Janvry, and Sadoulet (2001).   22 
from a migrant’s origin community in Mexico using lagged rainfall in the migrant’s origin 
community  (which  presumably  affects  the  marginal  productivity  of  labor  in  Mexican 
agriculture and so the incentive to migrate abroad).  His results suggest that having a larger 
network  improves  a  migrant’s  ability  to  assimilate  economically  in  the  United  States.  
Migration  networks  appear  to  be  organized  around  families.    Among  nonagricultural 
(agricultural) workers, 78% (74%) received assistance in finding a U.S. job, and among this 
group 47% (43%) received help from a relative and 47% (43%) received help from a friend 
or paisano (someone from their home region in Mexico).  The small remaining fraction of 
those receiving assistance relied on an employer, labor contractor or other source. 
 
  Even  accounting  for  heterogeneity  in  wage  expectations  among  migrants,  the 
volume of Mexico-to-U.S. migration is smaller than one might expect.  U.S.-Mexico real 
wage differentials are large today and have been large for over a century (Massey, Durand, 
and Zenteno, 2001).  The emerging literature on migration networks suggests that networks 
arise in response to hidden migration costs associated with finding employment and getting 
settled abroad.  Carrington et al. (1996) develop a model of regional labor movements in 
which migration networks lead migrant flows to be sluggish initially, when the migrant 
population is small, and then to accelerate over time, as migration costs endogenously fall in 
response to past migration.  Imperfect credit markets, which we discuss in the next section, 
are another explanation for sluggish migration.     
 
3.3 The Selection of Migrants from Mexico 
 
  In an important body of work, Borjas (1987, 1991) argues that who migrates to 
the  United  States  from  a  particular  country  will  depend  on  that  country’s  wage 
distribution.  In a country with high returns to skill and high wage dispersion, as in 
Mexico, there will be negative selection of migrants.  Those with the greatest incentive to 
migrate to the United States will be individuals with below-average skill levels in their 
home countries.  In support of this idea, Borjas (1987, 1995) finds that as sources for U.S. 
immigration  have  shifted  from  Europe  to  Latin  America  and  Asia,  the  economic 
performance  of  new  immigrants  has  deteriorated.    Relative  to  earlier  cohorts,  recent 
immigrants earn lower wages compared to natives at time of arrival and take longer for 
their earnings to converge to native levels.  These findings counter an earlier belief that 
immigrants tend to have high potential for earnings growth (Chiswick, 1978). 
 
  A simple test of the negative selection hypothesis is to compare the observable 
skills of migrants from Mexico with individuals in Mexico who choose not to migrate 
abroad.    While  selection  on  observables  does  not  necessarily  reflect  selection  on 
unobservables, one might expect individuals’ observable and unobservable skills to be 
positively correlated.  Table 4 shows educational attainment for Mexican immigrants in 
the United States and for residents of Mexico in 2000, based on census data from the two 
countries.  To help isolate the population of illegal immigrants, the table shows results 
separately for very recent immigrants (0-3 years in the United States) and for longer-term 
immigrants (4+ years in the United States).  Section 2 suggests a relatively high fraction 
of very recent immigrants are likely to be illegal immigrants.  To control for age, I limit 
the  sample  to  28-37  year  olds,  which  in  Table  2  is  the  age  cohort  with  the  highest   23 
likelihood of migrating abroad.  For comparison, the table also describes educational 
outcomes for the full sample of working-age residents of Mexico and immigrants from 
Mexico in the United States. 
 
It is well known that Mexican immigrants in the United States are much less 
educated than U.S. natives (Borjas and Katz, 2005).  However, Mexican immigrants, 
whether recent or longer term, compare favorably when we examine residents of Mexico.  
In 2000, 65% of male residents of Mexico had 9 or fewer years of schooling, compared to 
54%  of  recent  immigrants  and  51%  of  longer-term  immigrants.    Beyond  9  years  of 
education, Mexican immigrants outperform Mexican residents in every category except 
college graduates.  Relative to male residents of Mexico, recent Mexican immigrant men 
are more likely to have 10-15 years of education (40% versus 23%) and less likely to 
have 16 plus years of education (5% versus 12%).  A similar pattern holds for men in 
1990 and for women in either year.  It appears that in Mexico individuals with moderate 
to  high  education  levels  have  the  highest  likelihood  of  migrating  abroad,  which  is 
inconsistent with negative selection of migrants in terms of observable skills.   
 
Other data on Mexican migration are also inconsistent with negative selection.  
Using historical data from U.S. and Mexico population censuses, Feliciano (2001) finds 
that  average  schooling  of  Mexican  immigrants  has  been  higher  than  for  residents  of 
Mexico  since  at  least  1940.    Based  on  MMP  data,  in  which  the  vast  majority  of 
individuals  who  migrate  to  the  United  States  do  so  illegally  (at  least  on  their  first 
attempt), Orrenius and Zavodny (2005) estimate that the probability a young adult male 
migrates to the United States increases as schooling rises from low levels to levels around 
the national mean (eight years) and then declines as schooling rises to levels above the 
national mean.  McKenzie and Rapoport (2004) obtain similar results, also using the 
MMP.
45  These findings are similar to literature on internal migration in Botswana, India, 
the Philippines, and other developing countries, in which there appears to be an inverted 
U-shaped  relationship  between  rural  household  income  and  the  likelihood  that  a 
household finances urban migration for one or more of its members (Lucas, 1997). 
 
Chiquiar  and  Hanson  (2005)  develop  a  more  formal  approach  to  evaluate  the 
selection of Mexican immigrants in terms of observables.  Let the observed density of 
wages for individuals working in Mexico be 
 
    ￿ = = = dx ) MX i | x ( h ) x | w ( f ) MX i | w ( g MX ,    (8) 
 
and the observed density of wages for Mexicans working in the United States be 
 
    ￿ = = = dx ) US i | x ( h ) x | w ( f ) US i | w ( g US ,     (9) 
 
where f 
i(w|x) is the density of wages w in country i, conditional on a set of observed 
characteristics x, and h(x|i) is the density of observed characteristics in i.  Consider the 
                                                 
45 On migrant selection in Mexico, see also Ibarraran and Lubotsky (2005).   24 
density of wages that would prevail for Mexican immigrants in the United States if they 
were paid according to the price of skills in Mexico: 
 
  ￿ = = dx ) US i | x ( h ) x | w ( f ) w ( g MX MX
US .      (10) 
 
DiNardo,  Fortin,  and  Lemieux  (1996)  show  that,  under  the  assumption  that  the 
distribution of unobservables (conditional on the distribution of observables) is the same 
in the two countries, a counterfactual density as in (10) can be written as  
 
    dx ) MX i | x ( h ) x | w ( f ) w ( g MX MX





) US i Pr(
) MX i Pr(
) x | MX i Pr(
) x | US i Pr(
) MX i | x ( h









46    (12) 
 
Thus, the counterfactual density in (11) can be estimated by taking the observed density 
for  wage  earners  in  Mexico  and  re-weighting  it  to  reflect  characteristics  of  Mexican 
immigrant  workers  in  the  United  States.    The  weight  in  (12)  can  be  estimated 
parametrically by running a logit on the probability of a Mexico-born adult being in the 
United  States,  conditional  on  observed  characteristics,  using  a  sample  that  combines 
Mexican immigrants and Mexican residents.  
 
  By comparing actual and counterfactual wage densities, we can nonparametrically 
summarize the nature of migrant selection in Mexico.  Consider the difference between 
the actual wage density for residents of Mexico and the counterfactual wage density that 
would obtain were Mexican immigrants paid according to skill prices in Mexico:   
 
  dx ) MX i | x ( h ) x | w ( f ] 1 [ ) w ( g ) w ( g MX M MX MX
US = ￿ - q = - .  (13) 
 
If there is negative selection of migrants in terms of observable skills, the difference in 
(13) would show positive mass in the lower part of the wage distribution – indicating 
migrants are over-represented among Mexico-born individuals with below-average skills 
– and negative mass in the upper part – indicating migrants are under-represented among 
the Mexico-born with above-average skills.  In contrast, with positive selection there 
would be negative mass for low wages and positive mass for high wages. 
   
  Figure 10 shows estimates of the density difference in (13) for men and women in 
1990 and 2000, based on results in Chiquiar and Hanson (2005).  The sample is working-
age adults (21 to 65 years of age) who either reside in Mexico or are very recent Mexican 
                                                 
46 Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) show how to derive a weighting function similar to (12) that controls for 
differences in labor-force participation among workers in the two countries.  To simplify the exposition, I 
leave out the analytics behind this extension.  The results in Figure 10 control for differences in labor-force 
participation between Mexico and the United States.   25 
immigrants in the United States.  Immigrants are individuals 21 years or older at time of 
U.S.  entry  and  who  have  been  in  the  U.S.  for  3  years  or  less.    (Again,  very  recent 
immigrants are likely to include a relatively high fraction of illegal immigrants.)  The 
logit regression used to estimate the weights in (12) has as regressors dummy variables 
for age, schooling, and marital status, and interactions of these variables.   
   
Consistent  with  Table  4,  it  is  not  the  lowest-wage  individuals  who  exhibit  a 
stronger tendency to migrate to the United States.  In either year, for Mexican immigrant 
males there is greater mass in the middle of the wage density and less mass in either tail, 
when  compared  with  the  actual  wage  density  of  Mexico  residents.    The  immigrant-
resident density difference is close to zero in the left tail to just below zero, positive for 
middle  wage  values,  and  again  close  to  zero  in  the  right  tail.    This  suggests  that 
immigrant  males  are  drawn  disproportionately  from  the  middle  of  Mexico’s  wage 
distribution, rather than from the bottom half.   Low-wage and high-wage individuals 
appear to be relatively less likely to migrate to the United States.  These counterfactual 
wage densities support intermediate selection of immigrant men in terms of observable 
skills.  The  results  for  females  contain  even  less  support  for  negative  selection.    The 
immigrant-resident density difference is negative for low wage values, strongly positive 
for upper-middle wage values, and zero for high wage values.  For women, there appears 
to be moderate positive selection of immigrants.  
 
  Table  4  and  Figure  10  do  not  explicitly  separate  legal  and  illegal  Mexican 
immigrants, leaving it unclear how the two groups compare in terms of skill.  What does 
theory  suggest  about  the  self-selection  of  legal  versus  illegal  migrants?    Consider  a 
simple extension of Borjas (1991), who adapts the Roy (1951) model.
47  Let individuals 
from  Mexico,  indexed  by  0,  choose  whether  or  not  to  migrate  to  the  United  States, 
indexed by 1, where migration is a one-time decision (or, equivalently, a one-period 
decision).  Residents of Mexico face a wage equation given by 
 
  s ) w ln( 0 0 0 d + m = ,          (15) 
 
where for Mexico w0 is the wage,  0 m  is the base wage, s is the level of schooling, and  0 d  
is the return to schooling.  If the population of Mexicans were to migrate legally to the 
U.S., they would face the wage equation 
 





1 d + m = ,          (16) 
 
while if they were to migrate illegally they would face wage equation, 
 





1 d + m = .          (17) 
 
                                                 
47 For expositional simplicity, I consider a non-stochastic version of Borjas (1991), in which there is no 
unobserved component of skill.  The extension to a stochastic setting is straightforward.     26 
where i
1 w  is the wage,  i
1 m  is the base wage, and  i
1 d  is the return to skill for Mexican 
migrants with status i.  Higher levels of TFP and larger relative supplies of capital in the 
United States suggest the base wage is lower in Mexico ( 0
i
1 m > m , for i=I,L); higher U.S. 
relative supplies of human capital suggest that the return to schooling is higher in Mexico 
( 0
i
1 d < d , for i=I,L).  Table 3 supports both assumptions.  Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 
(2001) find that in the United States the base wage and the return to schooling are higher 
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Migrant selection also depends on the structure and financing of migration costs.  
Consider a setup similar to Borjas (1987), in which the migration cost for migration 
status i, C
i, expressed in time-equivalent units,  0
i i w / C = p , is assumed to be constant 
across individuals.  Combining equations (15)-(17), a resident of Mexico will be willing 
to migrate to the United States under migration status i if  
 







1 > p - - » + - .    (18) 
 
Suppose that migrants finance migration costs by borrowing and that to secure a loan of 
amount C
i a migrant must have collateral of amount ￿C
i, ￿>0.  Collateral requirements 
may reflect imperfect credit markets, which place initial wealth restrictions on which 
agents are capable of migrating abroad, as in Rapoport (2002), McKenzie and Rapoport 
(2004), and Orrenius and Zavodny (2005).
48 
 
  To  capture  the  relationship  between  credit  constraints  and  skill,  suppose  that 
individual wealth in Mexico, Y0, is a linear function of skill, such that 
 
          s Y 0 0 0 s + r = .        (19) 
 
Low-skill individuals will be unable to finance migration because they have insufficient 
collateral to secure a loan.  The lowest skill level for migration strategy i to be feasible is  
 









= ,.        (20) 
 
which is higher the larger are migration costs.  Whether the least skilled legal migrant is 
more  or  less  skilled  than  the  least  skilled  illegal  migrants  depends  on  the  relative 
magnitude  of  legal  and  illegal  migration  costs.    In  Cornelius  (2005),  recent  border-
crossing costs for illegal migrants range from $1200 to $1700 (in 2000 dollars).  The 
current costs of legal migration include fees paid to the U.S. government to process a visa 
application, which range from $700 and $1000 for family-sponsored immigration visas, 
                                                 
48 I limit the analysis to partial equilibrium.  Rapoport (2002) develops a general-equilibrium model of 
credit constraints and migration, based on the occupation-choice model in Banerjee and Newman (2003).   27 
and the expense of hiring a lawyer or immigration specialist to handle the application 
process, which typically ranges from $400 to $1000.
49  Ignoring the time costs involved 
in crossing the border illegally or in completing the bureaucratic steps needed to obtain a 
green card, entry costs for legal migrants from Mexico appear roughly similar in value to 
those for illegal migrants, in which case  I s  and  L s would also be similar. 
 
  Based on (18), high-skill individuals will choose not to migrate because higher 
returns to skill in Mexico make it more attract to stay at home.  The highest skill level for 
which migration strategy i is attractive is 
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which is higher the larger the U.S.-Mexico difference in the base wage and the smaller 
the U.S.-Mexico difference in the return to skill.  Thus, larger differences in the return to 
skill  between  countries  make  negative  selection  of  migrants  in  terms  of  skill  more 
pronounced.  I assume parameter values are such that  i i s s >  for i=I,L, which yields 
positive levels of both legal and illegal migration.  As long as the lower support for the 
distribution of skill is less than min ) s , s ( I L  and the upper support of the distribution of 
skill is greater than max ) s , s ( I L , both legal and illegal migrants will tend to be drawn 
from individuals with intermediate skill levels.  If legal and illegal migration costs are 
similar, Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark’s (2001) results on base wages and returns to skill for 
legal and illegal migrants would suggest that  I L s s ³ , or that the highest skilled legal 
migrants are at least as skilled as the highest skilled illegal migrants.   
 
  The simple theoretical model together with available empirical evidence suggests 
that legal migrants would be more positively selected than illegal migrants in terms of 
skill.  However, this outcome implicitly depends on all prospective migrants in Mexico 
having an equal probability of being eligible for a U.S. legal immigration visa.  There is 
no reason to expect this to be the case.  If more-skilled individuals are more (less) likely 
to have family members who are U.S. citizens or U.S. legal permanent residents, they 
will be more (less) able to obtain a U.S. green card, in which case there would be stronger 
(weaker)  positive  selection  of  legal  migrants  relative  to  illegal  migrants.    Also,  the 
discussion ignores dynamic considerations, in which individuals may migrate illegally 
today in expectation of obtaining a U.S. green card in the future.  As of yet, there is little 
empirical research on which types of households in Mexico appear to have better access 
to legal channels of obtaining a U.S. green card. 
 
  Combining (20) and (21), it is clear that as migration costs rise both legal and 
illegal  migrants  become  more  positively  selected  in  terms  of  skill  (i.e.,  the  interval 
                                                 
49 On fees for immigration visas, see http://uscis.gov/ and http://www.usavisanow.com/.     28 
) s , s ( i i , for i=I,L, shifts to the right).  In the MMP, Orrenius and Zavodny (2005) find 
that as the level of U.S. border enforcement rises (U.S. linewatch enforcement hours 
increase) the probability a young adult male migrates to the United States falls, with the 
effect being stronger for individuals with lower schooling levels.  This suggests that 
higher  migration  costs  disproportionately  select  lower-skilled  individuals  out  of  the 
migrant pool.  Similarly, McKenzie and Rapoport (2004) find that in MMP communities 
with  stronger  U.S.-migration  networks  the  inverted-U-shaped  relationship  between 
migration and schooling is weaker.  As migration costs fall (access to migration networks 
improves) positive selection of migrants becomes less pronounced. 
 
  There is abundant evidence that Mexican immigrants in the United States are 
disproportionately  drawn  from  the  middle  of  the  distribution  of  observable  skills  in 
Mexico.  While there are no data that explicitly differentiate between the selection pattern 
of legal and illegal migrants, there is intermediate selection among migrants in the MMP, 
in which a very high fraction of migrants are illegal.  Intermediate selection is consistent 
with migrants facing credit constraints in financing the cost of migration, such that low-
skill,  low-income  individuals  are  disproportionately  selected  out  of  the  migrant  pool.  
Other factors that could contribute to intermediate selection include higher discount rates 
greater risk aversion, or higher psychic migration costs among low-skilled, low-income 
individuals, such that these individuals are less willing to migrate to the United State for 
any given binational wage differential.  Credit constraints or some other factor is needed 
to  reconcile  the  facts  that  (a)  the  incentive  to  migrate  appears  to  be  strongest  for 
individuals  with  low  schooling  (as  seen  in  Table  3),  and  (b)  individuals  with  low 
schooling have a relatively low probability of migrating abroad (as seen in Table 4). 
 
3.4 Migration and the Supply of Labor in Mexico and the United States  
 
  As we have seen, the literature on labor flows from Mexico to the United States 
focuses  primarily  on  the  correlation  between  migration  and  U.S.-Mexico  earnings 
differences.  There is little work on the underlying causes on these wage differences or 
whether migration is related to variation in these causal factors.  The work that perhaps 
most closely addresses these issues is Robertson (2000), who examines the correlation 
between U.S. and Mexican wages over time.  Using synthetic cohorts constructed from 
household data in the two countries over 1987-1997, he regresses the quarterly change in 
Mexican wages for a given age-education-region cell on quarterly changes in U.S. wages 
for the same age-education cell and on the lagged difference in U.S. and Mexican wages 
for the cell.  A shock that raises U.S. wages by 10% is associated with an increase in 
wages in Mexican interior cities by 1.8% and wages in Mexican border cities by 2.5%.
50  
Positive comovements in U.S. and Mexican wages are consistent with the two countries’ 
                                                 
50 Robertson (2000) also finds that wage changes in Mexico are negatively correlated with the lagged U.S.-
Mexico wage difference, which suggests that over time wages in the two economies tend to converge.  The 
estimated convergence rates are very rapid, with equilibrium U.S.-Mexico wage differentials being reached 
within one to two quarters.  Rapid convergence seems at odds with rising levels of trade, investment, and 
migration between the two countries,  which suggests that integration of U.S. and Mexican  markets is 
incomplete and that wage convergence between the two countries is more gradual.   29 
labor markets being at least partially integrated.  Migration flows are one factor that may 
contribute to labor-market integration, as are cross-border trade and investment flows.  
 
  To examine further the determinants of labor flows from Mexico to the United 
States, consider a simple two-country model in which the aggregate production function 
for Mexico (indexed by 0) at time t is given by 
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where A0t is total factor productivity, K0t is the supply of capital, L0ht is the supply of 
labor of skill type h, ￿ ￿ 1 determines the elasticity of substitution between capital and 
labor (￿ = 1 – 1/￿KL), and ￿ ￿ 1 determines the elasticity of substitution between labor 
skill types (￿ = 1 – 1/￿hh’, all h￿h’).  Equating the wage to the marginal product of labor, 
 
    t 0 ht 0 t 0 t 0 ht 0 p ln L ln ) 1 ( L ln ) ( Q ln ) 1 ( w ln + - k + k - u + n - = ,  (23) 
 
where L0t is the labor aggregate in (22) and p0t is the price of Mexico’s output.  The 
aggregate production function for the United States (indexed by 1) has an analogous 
structure, with the added dimension that labor skill type h, L1ht, is an aggregate of the 
employment of native and immigrant workers, who are imperfect substitutes, such that 
 
        ( )h h h + =
1
ht ht 1 ht 1 I L L ,          (24) 
 
where ht 1 L  is the supply of native-born U.S. labor of skill type h, Iht is the supply of 
immigrant  labor  of  skill  type  h,  and  ￿  ￿  1  determines  the  elasticity  of  substitution 
between native and foreign labor (￿ = 1 – 1/￿LI)  The marginal product of immigrant 
labor in the United States (assumed to be the same for legal and illegal immigrants) is 
 
         t 1 ht ht 1 t 1 t 1 Iht p ln I ln ) 1 ( L ln ) ( L ln ) ( Q ln ) 1 ( w ln + - h + h - k + k - u + n - = ,  (25) 
 
where L1t is the U.S. labor aggregate and p1t is the price of U.S. output.   
 
If migration equalizes wages between the United States and Mexico, then 
 
      ht t 1 Iht t 0 ht 0 c ln P ln w ln P ln w ln - - = - ,      (26) 
 
where Pkt is the consumer price index in country k (expressed in terms of a common 
currency) and cht = 1 – Cht/(wIht/P1ht) is the migration cost for labor type h expressed as a 
markup over the wage rate.  Cht may be a function of U.S. border enforcement, or, if 
migration networks exist, of the existing U.S. stock of immigrants from Mexico.   30 
 
  Using (23)-(26) to solve for the level of immigration of skill type h, 
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Immigration  of  skill  type  h  workers  from  Mexico  is  (a)  decreasing  in  Mexico-U.S. 
relative GDP (which, in turn, is decreasing in Mexico-U.S. relative TFP and the Mexico-
U.S. relative supply of capital), (b) increasing in the Mexico-U.S. relative labor aggregate 
(as long as different labor skill types are more substitutable than are aggregate labor and 
capital, such that ￿ – ￿ ￿ 0), (c) increasing in the Mexico-U.S. relative supply of skill type 
h (as long as immigrant and native workers of the same skill type are more substitutable 
than are labor of different skill types, such that ￿ – ￿ ￿ 0), (d) decreasing in the Mexico-
U.S. terms of trade, (e) increasing in the Mexico-U.S. relative cost of living, and (f) 
decreasing in migration costs.  All else equal, immigration rises when Mexico has slower 
productivity growth, slower capital accumulation, faster labor-force growth, or negative 
terms-of-trade shifts relative to the United States.  
 
  What  is  the  relative  contribution  of  the  variables  on  the  right  of  (27)  to  the 
increase in Mexican migration to the United States?  Unfortunately, existing literature 
offers few answers to such a question.  For a preliminary take on the data, Figure 11 plots 
Mexico-U.S.  relative  real  GDP  per  worker,  the  Mexico-U.S.  terms  of  trade,  and  the 
Mexico-U.S. real exchange rate over the 1960-to-2000 period (based on the Penn World 
Tables).  Relative real GDP per worker is a crude proxy for a term that combines the first, 
second, fourth, and fifth terms in (27) (i.e., all terms except the relative supply of labor 
for skill type h and migration costs).  Relative income declines in the 1980s and is flat in 
the 1990s.  Slow growth in Mexico’s GDP and rapid growth in Mexico’s labor force have 
combined to make the U.S.-Mexico gap in income per worker larger in 2000 than it was 
in 1980.  Changes in the terms of trade appear to have mattered little for relative income 
changes.  Over the last two decades, the Mexico-U.S. terms of trade have been stable, 
consistent with the two countries exporting similar types of manufactured goods.
51 
 
Changes  in  aggregate  income  may  understate  the  contribution  of  binational 
income differences to Mexico-U.S. migration.  Relative average aggregate income may 
hide variation in income across sectors or regions in Mexico that affect migrant outflows.  
For  instance,  negative  income  shocks  to  Mexican  agriculture  or  to  Mexico’s  high-
migration states would likely increase migration abroad, even if positive income shocks 
to other sectors or regions helped smooth income at the national level.  Also, the relative 
variability  of  income  may  affect  migration,  independent  of  changes  in  relative  mean 
                                                 
51 Terms-of-trade changes in the Penn World Tables may understate true terms-of-trade changes. Within 
industries, Mexico and the United States tend to specialize at different ends of the production chain, with 
the United States focused more on capital-intensive component production and Mexico focused more on 
labor-intensive product assembly.  Such within-industry specialization may not be adequately reflected in 
conventional measures of the terms of trade, which fail to account for the fragmentation of production.   31 
income.  As movements in Mexico’s relative price level in Figure 11 indicate, Mexico’s 
economy has recently been subject to a high degree of price volatility. 
 
  To  characterize  changes  in  relative  labor  supplies  in  Mexico  and  the  United 
States,  Figure  12  shows  the  relative  size  of  the  working-age  population  in  the  two 
countries over the period 1970 to 2000.  I take the population of Mexican nationals to be 
the sum of individuals born in Mexico residing in either Mexico or the United States, 
which I then divide into age cohorts by gender.  To examine a population of U.S. natives 
who are likely to be substitutable in production with Mexican labor, I restrict U.S. age 
and gender cohorts to be individuals with a high-school education or less.  
   
  Over the 1980-to-1990 and 1990-to-2000 periods, there is a dramatic increase in 
the supply of young Mexican nationals relative to the supply of young less-educated U.S. 
natives.  In 1980, Mexico’s supply of 20-29 year olds was just over half the size of the 
U.S. population of less-educated 20-29 year olds.  By 2000, Mexico’s supply was larger 
than the U.S. supply.  The change in relative supply occurred in part because a large 
cohort of young Mexicans entered the labor force in the 1980s and 1990s and in part 
because  more  U.S.  natives  now  continue  their  education  beyond  high  school.    The 
increase  in  relative  labor  supply  is  especially  strong  among  women,  for  whom  skill 
upgrading in the United States has been most pronounced (Katz and Autor, 1999).   
 
  As  further  evidence  of  the  contribution  of  relative  labor-supply  changes  to 
Mexico-U.S. migration, Figure 13 plots the stock of Mexican immigrants in the United 
States against the Mexico-U.S. relative supply of labor by gender and age cohort over the 
1970-to-2000 period (where I use five-year age cohorts to increase the sample size).  I 
restrict U.S. natives to be either those with a high-school education or less or those with 
less than a high-school education, which roughly approximates a plot of ln(Iht) against 
ln(L0ht/L1ht) in (27).
52  Across cohorts and time, there is a strong positive correlation 
between Mexico-U.S. migration and the relative supply of Mexican labor.  Figure 13 
gives  suggestive  evidence  that  increases  in  the  relative  supply  of  Mexican  labor 
contribute to migration abroad, presumably by pushing down Mexican wages.  
 
  Surprisingly, the determinants of wage differences between the United States and 
Mexico and their link to Mexico-U.S. migration flows are largely unexplored topics.  A 
cursory  glance  at  the  data  suggests  that  a  combination  of  slow  growth  in  Mexico’s 
economy  and  rapid  growth  in  Mexico’s  labor  force  have  contributed  to  rising  labor 
outflows in recent years.  However, many details about this story are unknown.  In the 
last  two  decades,  Mexico  has  undertaken  major  economic  reforms,  which  may  have 
changed the distribution of factor rewards or the distribution of regional incomes in a 
manner  that  increased  the  incentive  to  emigrate.
53    The  migration  function  in  (27) 
                                                 
52 To keep this approximation as literal as possible, I define the supply of Mexican labor to be residents of 
Mexico and the supply of U.S. labor to be the sum of Mexican immigrants in the United States and less-
educated U.S. natives (where both variables are measured by age and gender cohort). 
53 These reforms include a liberalization of foreign trade and investment (unilaterally over the period 1985 
to  1989  and  trilaterally  with  Canada  and  the  United  States  under  the  North  American  Free  Trade 
Agreement in 1994), the privatization of state-run enterprises and the deregulation of industry (in the late 
1980s and early 1990s), and changes in the land-tenure system (in the early 1990s, which privatized land   32 
suggests  the  link  between  relative  factor  supplies  and  migrant  flows  depends  on  the 
substitutability of Mexican and U.S. labor, which we know little about (Borjas, 2003).
54  
And,  while  there  is  considerable  micro-level  evidence  that  migration  networks  affect 
individual migration decisions, there are few estimates of the impact of these networks on 
aggregate labor flows.  Thus, the literature provides little guidance for thinking about 
how  GDP  growth,  population  growth,  skill  upgrading,  or  other  shocks  to  national 




  Differences in earnings between the United States and Mexico are one factor that 
contributes to Mexico-to-U.S. migration.  Consistent with previous migration research in 
many other contexts, labor outflows from Mexico increase when U.S.-Mexico income or 
wage differences increase.  Illegal migration flows, measured either using survey data on 
migrant-sending communities in Mexico or apprehensions at the U.S.-Mexico border, are 
quite responsive to relative income changes.  Access to migration networks also appears 
to facilitate cross-border labor flows. 
 
  The  literature  has  made  little  progress  in  identifying  how  the  underlying 
determinants  U.S.-Mexico  wage  differences  affect  binational  migration.    Another 
unresolved issue is why, given large income differences between the United States and 
Mexico and small observed costs in crossing the border illegally, migration flows are not 
larger.  There appear to be unobserved sources of migration costs (or heterogeneity in the 
perceived  benefits  of  migrating  abroad)  that  are  important  enough  to  impede  many 
individuals from leaving Mexico.  These unobserved costs appear to be especially large 
for  less-educated  individuals,  who  have  relatively  low  migration  propensities  despite 
having relatively large apparent returns to migration. 
 
   
4.  Policies to Control Illegal Immigration 
 
  Many  government  policies  play  a  role  in  determining  the  level  of  illegal 
immigration.  Some policies, including the enforcement of international borders and the 
monitoring  of  hiring  practices  by  employers,  affect  illegal  immigration  directly.    By 
changing the intensity with which they enforce borders or monitor employers, authorities 
effectively regulate the inflow of illegal immigrants from abroad.  In the United States, 
enforcement policies are under the control of federal government agencies and can be 
changed frequently, even on a day-to-day basis.  Other policies, including quotas for 
permanent or temporary legal immigration, the rights of immigrants to draw on public 
assistance,  and  minimum-wage  requirements,  affect  illegal  inflows  indirectly  through 
their impact on the expected reward from unauthorized migration.  In the United States, 
                                                                                                                                                 
previously  held  by  rural  cooperatives).    Aguayo  (2005)  finds  that  in  the  1990s  individuals  from 
communities more exposed land reform were more likely to migrate internally in Mexico. 
54 Cortes (2005) and Ottaviano and Peri (2005) provide recent evidence that in the United States low-skilled 
native and foreign labor are less than perfect substitutes.   33 
these and other such indirect policies are set by Congress and tend to change slowly over 
time, which has made their impact on illegal immigration difficult to gauge.   
 
  In this section, I examine U.S. policies to control illegal immigration.  I focus on 
enforcement  policies,  as  these  have  been  the  subject  of  most  academic  research.  
Theoretical literature considers the incentives of countries to restrict illegal immigration 
and  the  political  economy  of  impediments  to  labor  inflows  from  abroad;  empirical 
literature examines the impact of enforcement policies on migrant flows.  There is little 
work on policies that restrict labor outflows, as such policies do not exist in Mexico and 
are uncommon except in highly authoritarian regimes. 
 
4.1 U.S. Border and Interior Enforcement Policies   
 
  There is considerable academic and policy interest in the economic impact of U.S. 
actions to prevent illegal immigration.  The increase in the stock of illegal immigrants in 
the United States, evident in Table 1, indicates that U.S. enforcement efforts have not 
succeeded in stopping illegal entry from Mexico or other countries.  The concomitant 
increase in U.S. resources devoted to enforcement, seen in Figure 5, suggests that the lack 
of success is not for want of effort. 
 
  In political science and sociology literature, rising illegal immigration tends to be 
interpreted as a result of policy failure (Andreas, 2000; Massey, Durand, and Malone, 
2003; Cornelius, Tsuda, Martin, and Hollifield, 2004; Cornelius, 2005).  Due to political 
constraints, the United States has focused on border enforcement, rather than monitoring 
U.S. employers, which appears ill-suited to curtail unauthorized entry in a country that 
shares a 2,000-mile long land border with a poor neighbor.  Further, the United States has 
chosen  to  concentrate  enforcement  resources  in  border  cities,  leaving  less  populated 
corridors  largely  unpoliced  through  which  illegal  immigrants  continue  to  enter  the 
country in large numbers.  Are U.S. enforcement policies ineffective?  And, if so, why 
have U.S. immigration authorities chosen these policies?  I deal with research on the first 
question in this section and on the second question in the next. 
 
  Each year, the U.S. Congress appropriates funds to the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) for enforcement of U.S. borders, which falls under U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection, and for enforcement of immigration laws in the U.S. interior, which 
falls under U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.  (Prior to 2002, both border and 
interior  enforcement  belonged  to  the  now-defunct  Immigration  and  Naturalization 
Service(INS) in the U.S. Department of Justice.)   
 
  The U.S. Border Patrol, the primary agency responsible for border enforcement, is 
part of U.S. Customs and Border Protection.  Border Patrol officers may be deployed to 
linewatch duty, in which they attempt to apprehend unauthorized immigrants at the U.S.-
Mexico border; to entry points along the U.S.-Mexico and U.S.-Canada borders, at which 
they monitor pedestrian and vehicular traffic entering the  United States; or to traffic 
checkpoints along major highways inland from border crossings, at which they conduct 
inspections.    Some  of  these  activities  (linewatch  duty)  are  more  oriented  toward   34 
preventing illegal immigration, while others (traffic checks) are more oriented toward 
preventing the smuggling of contraband.  The broad scope of Border Patrol activities 
suggests that DHS officials (and INS officials before them) have sufficient discretion in 
allocating resources to allow them to vary the intensity with which they enforce borders 
against illegal immigration.  Discretion creates an opportunity for political pressure to 
influence enforcement activities over short time horizons (as well as through the more-
protracted congressional appropriations process). 
 
  The  detection  of  illegal  immigrants  in  the  U.S.  interior  falls  under  U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).  The activities of ICE agents (and of INS 
agents before the creation of DHS) include attempts to apprehend illegal immigrants at 
U.S. worksites, investigations of international smuggling operations, and prosecutions 
and  deportations  of  non-citizens  who  have  been  convicted  of  a  felony  in  the  United 
States.  As with the Border Patrol, DHS officials have discretion in how ICE agents are 
deployed,  allowing  them  to  vary  the  intensity  of  interior  enforcement  against  illegal 
immigration at the local, regional, and national level. 
 
  Boeri,  Hanson,  and  McCormick  (2002)  document  that  U.S.  immigration 
authorities  apprehend  far  more  illegal  immigrants  at  U.S.  borders  than  in  the  U.S. 
interior.    Table  5,  which  shows  “deportable  aliens”  located  by  U.S.  immigration 
authorities from 1992 to 2004, updates their data.  (Deportable aliens include, primarily, 
apprehended illegal immigrants, and, secondarily, legal immigrants subject to deportation 
because they have committed a criminal offense.)  Over the period, 93% of deportable 
aliens were located by the Border Patrol, rather than by ICE or INS agents in the U.S. 
interior.  Of those apprehended by the Border Patrol, 97% were Mexican nationals.  And, 
of apprehensions of Mexican illegal aliens, less than 1% occurred at U.S. worksites.  The 
vast  majority  of  Mexican  nationals  apprehended  were  “seeking  employment,”  which 
generally means they were caught trying to cross the U.S.-Mexico border illegally. 
 
  Apprehensions of illegal immigrants are a policy output.  How might one measure 
inputs into enforcement policy?  For border enforcement, the primary inputs are officer 
hours  the  Border  Patrol  spends  policing  the  border  and  capital  expenditure  on 
enforcement infrastructure.  In Figure 5, between 1990 and 2003 officer hours devoted to 
border enforcement increased by 3.8 times, from 2.5 million to 9.5 million.  For interior 
enforcement,  measures  of  policy  inputs  are  more  difficult  to  obtain.    Those  that  are 
available  suggest  immigration  authorities  devote  a  relatively  small  share  of  their 
resources to the U.S. interior.  Between 1999 and 2003, the number of man hours ICE 
agents devoted to worksite inspections declined from 480,000 (or 9% of total INS agent 
hours) to 180,000 hours (or 4% of total ICE agent hours) (GAO, 2005).  Thus, in 2003 
U.S.  immigration  authorities  devoted  53  times  as  many  officer  hours  to  linewatch 
enforcement as to worksite enforcement.  One consequence of low worksite enforcement 
is that few U.S. employers who hire illegal immigrants are detected or prosecuted.  The 
number of U.S. employers paying fines of at least $5,000 for hiring unauthorized workers 
was only 15 in 1990, which then fell to 12 in 1994 to 2 in 1998 and to 0 in 2004.  A   35 
recent  U.S.  General  Accounting  Office  study  concludes,  “The  worksite  enforcement 
program has been a low priority under both the INS and ICE” (GAO, 2005).
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  The emphasis of border enforcement over interior enforcement does not appear to 
be due to illegal immigrants being difficult to locate once they are inside the United 
States.  Several U.S. industries, including agriculture, construction, and restaurants and 
hotels, appear to employ large numbers of unauthorized workers.  The U.S. Department 
of Labor (2005) reports that over the period 1999 to 2002 54% of the U.S. farm laborers 
it surveyed were in the United States illegally.  At harvest time, in the late summer and 
early  fall,  many  of  these  workers  are  plainly  visible  at  farms  in  California,  Texas, 
Washington, and elsewhere in the western United States.  U.S. immigration authorities 
simply choose not to conduct large-scale raids on U.S. farms, construction sites, or other 
places of business where illegal immigrants tend to work. 
 
  Beyond concentrating on border enforcement, U.S. immigration authorities target 
their efforts at specific locations along the border.  Figure 14 plots annual hours the U.S. 
Border Patrol officers spent on linewatch duty by region along the border over the period 
1977 to 2003.  Officer hours increase sharply in the early 1990s in Texas, in the mid 
1990s  in  Western  California  (San  Diego),  and  in  the  late  1990s  in  Arizona.    These 
increases  reflect  successive  Border  Patrol  operations  near  specific  U.S.  border  cities, 
including El Paso, San Diego, El Centro, and McAllen (Reyes, Johnson, and Van, 2002).  
Operations involve increased patrols, constructing walls and barricades, and mounting 
electronic surveillance equipment.  Figure 14 also plots apprehensions by U.S. Border 
Patrol officers on linewatch duty by border region.  Following the increase in Border 
Patrol activities in Western California, apprehensions declined in the region but shortly 
thereafter increased in nearby Eastern California and Arizona.  In response to greater 
border security in San Diego, which in the 1970s and 1980s was the primary illegal entry 
point along the border, prospective migrants appear to have shifted their attempts to enter 
the  United  States  to  the  more  remote  desert  regions  of  the  California-Mexico  and 
Arizona-Mexico borders.  Border Patrol operations have succeeded in reducing illegal 
border  crossings  at  targeted  locations,  but  not,  as  the  increase  in  illegal  immigration 
during the 1990s reveals, at other locations along the border.   
 
  There is active debate in policy circles about the effectiveness with which U.S. 
immigration authorities deploy the resources they have available.  In their own defense, 
authorities  claim  that  they  are  overwhelmed  by  current  levels  of  attempted  illegal 
immigration (GAO, 2001).  Even with the increase in enforcement resources, authorities 
suggest they have been unable to staunch in the inflow of unauthorized migrants because 
the number of those attempting to enter the United States illegally has risen too fast.  An 
opposing  line  of  argument  is  that  immigration  authorities  deploy  their  enforcement 
resources  ineffectively  for  strategic  motives  (Cornelius  et  al.,  2004).    In  response  to 
political pressure from employers and other groups that benefit from illegal immigration, 
goes the reasoning, U.S. immigration authorities choose not to enforce U.S. laws against 
                                                 
55 Further, since September, 2001, and the shift in government priorities toward preventing terrorist attacks, 
the  majority  of  time  ICE  agents  spend  on  worksite  enforcement  is  devoted  to  monitoring  “critical 
infrastructure sites,” such as airports and power plants (GAO, 2005).   36 
hiring illegal immigrants and to deploy the Border Patrol in a manner that allows large 
numbers of illegal immigrants to enter the country. 
 
  Has increased U.S. border enforcement in fact made illegal immigration in the 
United States more costly?
56  Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999) find that, controlling for 
the endogeneity of enforcement, border apprehensions increase as border enforcement 
increases.  This finding suggests that expanded enforcement makes crossing the border 
more difficult (since more of those attempting illegal immigration are being caught at the 
border),  but  it  does  not  reveal  whether  greater  difficulty  in  border  crossing  deters 
prospective migrants from attempting to enter the United States illegally. 
 
  Gathmann (2004) provides more direct evidence of the consequences of expanded 
border enforcement for migration.  She uses MMP data to examine the correlates of 
coyote prices paid by migrants from Mexico to the United States and to estimate the 
impact of coyote prices on migrant demand for smuggler services.
57  The price a migrant 
pays  to  a  smuggler  is  higher  in  years  when  border  enforcement  is  higher.    But  the 
elasticity of coyote prices with respect to enforcement is small, in the range of 0.2 to 0.5.  
During the sample period, a one-standard-deviation increase in enforcement would have 
lead to an increase in coyote prices of less than $40; in the mid 1990s average coyote 
prices  were  $410.    The  estimated  demand  for  smuggler  services  and  the  individual 
probability  of  choosing  to  migrate  to  the  United  States  are  both  quite  responsive  to 
changes in coyote prices.  However, given the small enforcement elasticity of coyote 
prices, the observed increase in border enforcement over 1986 to 1998 appeared to reduce 
the average migration probability among MMP respondents by only 10%. 
 
  Gathmann’s  results,  of  course,  are  conditional  on  the  pattern  of  border 
enforcement that was realized over the sample period.  By increasing enforcement in 
some  border  locations  but  not  others,  U.S.  immigration  authorities  may  have 
(intentionally or not) mitigated the impact of expanded enforcement on smuggler prices.  
Gathmann documents that as the United States carried out its 1990s border buildup many 
migrants shifted from higher-enforcement to lower-enforcement crossing points.  We do 
not know how coyote prices would respond to a border-wide increase in enforcement as 
the United States has yet to carry out that experiment. 
 
  Another issue is that MMP data may lead one to underestimate the impact of 
enforcement on smuggler prices.  MMP communities have sent migrants to the United 
States for decades.  Many families in these communities have long-term relationships 
with  coyotes.    Prices  coyotes  charge  long-term  customers  may  be  less  responsive  to 
shocks than prices they charge on the smuggling spot market used by migrants in the rest 
                                                 
56 For earlier work on this question, see Espenshade (1994, 1995), Kossoudji (1992), Donato, Durand, and 
Massey (1992), and Massey and Singer (1995).  For other recent work see Angelucci (2003). 
57 In the estimation of coyote prices, Gathmann (2004) instruments for border enforcement using the drug 
budget of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).  In the estimation of the demand for coyote services, 
she includes both the smuggler price and the level of border enforcement as regressors, instrumenting for 
the former with the average U.S. prison term for smugglers (which rises over the sample period) and for the 
latter again with the DEA drug budget. Under the assumption of normality in the errors, she is able to 
control for selection into migration (by exploiting MMP data on non-migrants).   37 
of Mexico.  Hence, in the rest of the country attempted illegal migration could more 
responsive to border enforcement than Gathmann’s results suggest. 
 
  The  United  States  has  undertaken  a  massive  increase  in  the  resources  that  it 
devotes  to  border  enforcement.    Yet,  the  apparent  impact  of  this  increase  has  been 
modest.  While expanded border enforcement has reduced attempted illegal entry at what 
used to be major crossing points in California and Texas border cities, it appears to have 
had a small effect on deterring illegal immigration overall (measured either in terms of 
changes in smuggler prices or the average probability a Mexican national migrates to the 
United States).  One possibility is that there are important non-convexities in enforcement 
such that it only becomes an effective deterrent to illegal entry at high levels of resource 
commitment.  This is perhaps the implicit argument of those calling for further expansion 
of U.S. enforcement efforts.
58  Another possibility is that U.S. enforcement strategies are 
ineffective by design, due to the political economy of immigration control.   
   
4.2 The Determination of U.S. Enforcement Policies 
 
  In the absence of economic distortions, the optimal immigration policy would be 
to have open borders.  All else equal, immigration raises national income by allowing 
countries  to  use  fixed  factors  more  productively,  making  free  immigration  welfare 
maximizing.  In practice, countries may choose to restrict immigration because existing 
distortions, such as the existence of social-insurance programs financed by non-lump-
sum taxes, make a departure from free immigration the constrained optimum (Scholten 
and Thum, 1996; Wellisch and Walz, 1998; Razin and Sadka, 1999).
59  Or, governments 
may  choose  to  restrict  immigration  because  they  weight  the  welfare  of  different 
individuals  unequally,  for  whatever  reason  favoring  those  opposed  to  immigration 
(Foreman-Peck, 1992).  For instance, if the median voter is a worker whose wages would 
be reduced by immigration, politicians may choose to restrict immigration in order to 
enhance their future electoral prospects (Benhabib, 1996).   
 
  Policies to address illegal immigration enter a country’s choice set when legal 
immigrant admissions are subject to binding restrictions and the enforcement of borders 
against illegal entry is costly.  Enforcement costs may be due to the expense of policing 
the border or to agency costs associated with giving immigration authorities an incentive 
to implement laws against unauthorized entry. 
 
  Using  Becker’s  (1968)  crime-theoretic  framework,  Either  (1986a,b)  derives 
conditions under which border enforcement raises national income.  In the absence of 
migration, wages in a home country exceed wages in a foreign country.  Restrictions on 
legal  migration  prevent  legal  labor  flows  from  equalizing  international  factor  prices, 
creating an incentive for illegal migration.  The home country interdicts illegal migrants 
                                                 
58 See Steven A. Camarota, “Use Enforcement to Ease Situation,” Arizona Republic, October 23, 2005. 
59 See Hanson (2005b) and Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter (2006) for evidence on how the public-finance 
consequences of immigration affect individual preferences toward immigration in the United States.  See 
Sinn, Flaig, Werding, Munz and Hofmann (2003) and Razin and Sadka (2003) for analysis of the public-
finance consequences of immigration in welfare states similar to the European context.   38 
through costly border enforcement.  Let the probability of apprehension, 0 ￿ g ￿ 1, be an 
increasing, convex function of expenditure on enforcement, E, which is financed by taxes 
on skilled labor.  The home-country wage for unskilled natives, w, is then related to the 
alternative foreign-country wage of illegal labor, w
*, through the equalization of expected 
wages that results from illegal migration: 
 
k w )] E ( g 1 [ w ) E ( g w * * - - + = ,      (28) 
 
where  k  is  the  cost  of  migration  (which,  distinct  from  Either  (1986a),  I  suppose  is 
incurred  whether  or  not  an  individual  is  apprehended).    Consider  the  impact  of  an 
increase in enforcement on the home-foreign wage gap.  Totally differentiating (28) 
 










= - .     (29) 
 
The expression in (29) is positive, implying greater enforcement increases the home-
foreign  wage  difference,  as  long  as  the  apprehension  probability  is  increasing  in 
enforcement (g’ ￿ 0), the initial wage gap is positive (absent which there would be no 
incentive to migrate), and migration costs (e.g., smuggler prices) are weakly increasing in 
enforcement (k’ ￿ 0).  In (29), one can see that changes in enforcement affect the wage 
for unskilled workers in the home country through three channels:  by lowering wages in 
the foreign country (greater enforcement increases foreign labor supply, lowering the 
foreign wage), by lowering the probability that those attempting migration succeed in 
entering  the  country  (greater  enforcement  means  a  given  level  of  attempted  illegal 
immigration has a smaller impact on the home-country’s labor supply), and by raising the 
cost of crossing the border (greater enforcement raises coyote prices).    
 
  Ethier (1986a) identifies two environments in which interdicting illegal migrants 
raises national income:  the existence of downward wage rigidity in the home-country 
market  for  unskilled  labor,  such  that  border  enforcement  lowers  unemployment  by 
reducing illegal immigration; and the presence of market power in the home-country 
demand for foreign labor, such that greater border enforcement lowers the wage the home 
country has to pay immigrant workers.   In the absence of these or other distortions, 
enforcement is welfare reducing.
60 
 
  One implication of Ethier’s work is that for border enforcement to be more than a 
resource drain on the home country it must affect outcomes in sending and receiving 
labor  markets.    We  have  already  seen  evidence  in  Gathmann  (2004)  that  in  Mexico 
                                                 
60 Extending Ethier’s analysis, Bond and Chen (1987) introduce international capital mobility, Djajic (1987, 
1999)  puts  migration  in  a  dynamic  setting,  Bandyopadhyay  and  Bandyopadhyay  (1998)  and  Gaytán-
Fregoso and Lahiri (200) consider interactions of trade policy or foreign aid and illegal migration, and 
Woodland  and  Yoshida  (2005)  examine  border  enforcement  where  illegal  migrants  are  risk  averse.  
Another distortion that could potentially justify positive border enforcement is the presence of welfare 
policies  that  result  in  net  fiscal  subsidies  to  illegal  immigrants  (through  their  use  of  public  schools, 
emergency health care, and other public services).    39 
higher U.S. border enforcement is associated with modestly higher smuggler prices and 
modestly lower migrant outflows.  Are there measurable impacts of border enforcement 
in the United States?  Hanson, Robertson, and Spilimbergo (2001) examine the effect of 
border  enforcement  on  wages  in  U.S.  and  Mexican  border  regions.    If  enforcement 
impedes illegal immigration, and if illegal immigrants depress wages in the regions in 
which they settle, then wages in receiving (sending) border regions will tend to rise (fall) 
after an increase in enforcement.  They use quarterly data for 1980 to 1997 on wages in 
immigrant-labor-intensive industries in U.S. border states and among less-skilled workers 
in Mexican border cities.  For high-immigrant industries (apparel, textiles, food products, 
furniture)  in  California  and  Texas,  they  find  zero  correlation  between  wages  and 
enforcement of the Mexico-U.S. border in that state.  They also find no evidence of a 
positive effect of border enforcement on the wages of workers with low-education levels 
(high-school  dropouts  or  high-school  graduates)  in  border  regions  of  California  or 
Texas.
61  For Mexico, the impact of U.S. border enforcement appears to be larger.  In 
Tijuana, which is the most active crossing point for illegal immigrants during the sample 
period, greater U.S. enforcement at the city’s border with San Diego is associated with 
lower wages for less-skilled workers (up to six years of education). 
 
   There  are  two  quite  different  interpretations  of  Hanson,  Robertson,  and 
Spilimbergo’s results.  One is that that border enforcement deters illegal immigrants, but 
illegal immigration has a minimal impact on labor markets in U.S. border regions.  U.S. 
border regions may adjust to influxes of illegal immigrants without large changes in 
wages either through U.S. native workers exiting these regions (Borjas, Freeman, and 
Katz, 1997) or through border economies shifting towards industries that are relatively 
intensive in the use of immigrant labor (Card and Lewis, 2005).  A second interpretation 
of their results is that border enforcement has a minimal impact on illegal immigration, 
consistent with Espenshade (1994) and Massey  and Singer (1995).  It would still be 
conceivable that illegal immigration puts downward pressure on wages in U.S. border 
regions, but, since border enforcement does not impede illegal immigration, there would 
be zero correlation between enforcement and wages in U.S. border regions.  Gathmann’s 
(2004) results suggest border enforcement does affect migration costs.  And it is the case 
that wages in Tijuana decline following increases in border enforcement, even if wages 
don’t change in California or Texas. 
 
  The framework in Either (1986a,b) is a normative analysis of border enforcement.  
Turning to positive questions, how does the U.S. Congress decide on the level of funding 
for  immigration  control  and  how  do  U.S.  immigration  authorities  allocate  budgeted 
resources between enforcement and other activities for which they are responsible?  In 
the  context  of  trade  policy,  Grossman  and  Helpman  (1994)  develop  a  framework  in 
which endogenously determined industry campaign contributions affect import tariffs on 
foreign goods.  Facchini and Willmann (2005) extend the Grossman-Helpman model to 
consider policies on international factor mobility.  In their setup, governments restrict 
factor inflows from abroad through a per-factor unit tax or quota.  Facchini and Willmann 
                                                 
61 Both sets of results hold with or without instrumenting for border enforcement (to control for the INS setting 
enforcement in response to economic conditions in U.S. or Mexican border areas) using data on U.S. political cycles 
(see note 26) and entry activity at other U.S. international boundaries (ports and Canadian border crossings).   40 
make  two  important  assumptions  about  the  structure  of  immigration  policy:    (i)  the 
receiving-country  government  captures  factor  tax  revenues  or  quota  rents,  which  it 
rebates to citizens, and (ii) individuals are organized according to their factor type and 
lobby the government on immigration policy.  In equilibrium, each factor lobby offers the 
government campaign contributions to support stronger (weaker) restrictions on inflows 
of factors for which its members substitute (complement) in production. 
 
  Facchini and Willimann’s first assumption appears to be counterfactual.  In the 
context of illegal immigration, the U.S. and other governments do not collect payments 
associated with factor inflows.  On the contrary, the government spends resources on 
enforcement to impede the immigration of labor.  Their second assumption has more 
empirical support.  Periodic attempts by the INS or ICE to increase interior enforcement 
are  met  with  political  opposition.    For  instance,  in  2005  the  Western  Growers 
Association, a business lobby representing farmers in the western United States, issued a 
statement complaining that excessive enforcement was preventing farmers in Arizona 
from hiring sufficient immigrant labor to harvest their winter lettuce crop.
62  In 1998, INS 
raids of onion fields at harvest time in the state of Georgia prompted the U.S. Attorney 
General, both Georgia U.S. senators, and three Georgia congressional representatives to 
criticize the INS for injuring Georgia farmers.
63  There is also historical evidence of anti-
enforcement  efforts  by  business  groups.    In  the  1940s  and  1950s,  the  district 
commissioner of the U.S. Border Patrol in El Paso would routinely issue orders to stop 
apprehending illegal immigrants during the agricultural harvest season (Calavita, 1992).  
On occasions when the Border Patrol did increase enforcement activities, Texas farmers 
often complained to their congressional representatives, who pressured the INS (through 
formal written communication) to be less aggressive. 
 
  Lax  worksite  enforcement  by  the  U.S.  government  is  indirect  evidence  that 
political factors influence the intensity with which the country enforces against illegal 
immigration.  Hanson and Spilimbergo (2001) search for systematic evidence of such 
effects.  They estimate the sensitivity of border enforcement to relative price changes in 
industries that use unauthorized immigrant labor intensively (apparel, perishable fruits 
and vegetables, slaughtered livestock, construction).  In theory, higher relative prices for 
immigrant-intensive industries would increase the returns to lobbying for weaker border 
enforcement.    Controlling  for  macroeconomic  conditions  in  the  United  States  and 
Mexico, they find that increases in the relative product price for an immigrant-intensive 
industry today is associated with a decrease in border enforcement six to ten months in 
the future.  This finding suggests authorities relax enforcement when the demand for 
undocumented  workers  increases.    Enforcement  also  rises  when  overall  labor-market 
conditions in the United States tighten, which suggests that the U.S. government raises 
enforcement when attempted illegal immigration is expected to be high.   
 
                                                 
62 See Miriam Jordan, “As Border Tightens, Growers See Threat to ‘Winter Salad Bowl,’” The Wall Street 
Journal, March 11, 2005, p. 1. 
63  See Mark Krikorian, "Lured by Jobs, Illegal Immigrants Risk Death at Border Crossings,” Santa Barbara 
News-Press, April 25, 1999.   41 
  It appears, then, that enforcement softens when the specific sectors that use illegal 
aliens intensively expand but not when the overall demand for labor is high.  This is 
suggestive of a free-rider problem among special-interest groups, in which sectors that 
benefit greatly from lower border enforcement, such as apparel and agriculture, lobby 
politicians on the issue (and lobby more strongly when the gains to higher immigration 




  Restricting  unauthorized  immigration  only  makes  sense  for  a  country  that  is 
subject to distortions that would be exacerbated by illegal labor inflows.  By selecting the 
intensity with which it enforces U.S. borders against unauthorized entry and monitors the 
employment practices of U.S. business, U.S. immigration authorities implicitly determine 
the  level  of  illegal  immigration.    The  United  States  makes  stark  choices  in  its 
enforcement polices.  It heavily polices specific U.S. border cities, maintains a lighter 
presence in less-populated areas, and weakly enforces U.S. worksites.  There has been 
little research by economists on the political economy of policies specifically related to 
illegal immigration.  The work that does exist suggests that special interest groups are 
active in attempting to influence U.S. enforcement practices. 
 
 
5. Concluding Discussion 
 
  In the United States, unauthorized immigration accounts for one-third to one-half 
of new immigrant inflows.  Mexico is by far and away the largest source country for 
those entering the United State illegally.  An emerging body of academic research on 
illegal migration from Mexico to the United States has made progress on many fronts.  
Yet, the literature is at an early stage.  Heightened policy interest in illegal immigration, 
both in the United States and Mexico, suggests the many unanswered questions, some of 
which I now highlight, will receive attention in the time to come. 
 
  Available  measures  of  the  stock  and  flow  of  illegal  migrants  are  imprecise, 
hampered by the unwillingness of official government agencies to question individuals 
about  their  immigration  status.    With  the  U.S.  population  of  illegal  immigrants  now 
exceeding  10  million  individuals,  one  would  expect  that,  at  the  very  least,  U.S. 
government household surveys would conduct post-enumeration surveys that explicitly 
ask individuals about their immigration status.  This would allow researchers to estimate 
the stock of illegal immigrants with much more precision.  Of greater benefit would be 
incorporating  questions  about  immigration  status  directly  into  the  U.S.  Census  of 
Population or U.S. Current Population Survey.  There is precedent for U.S. government 
surveys including questions about whether a respondent has a legal immigration visa.  
For over a decade, the U.S. Department of Labor has conducted surveys of U.S. farm 
workers in which it explicitly asks whether an individual is in the United States legally or 
illegally (e.g., U.S. Department of Labor, 2005).   
     42 
  A  handful  of  data  sources  provide  information  about  illegal  immigrants  from 
Mexico in the United States.  Immigrants from Mexico, whether legal or illegal, are 
drawn disproportionately from the middle of the country’s schooling distribution.  Over 
time, illegal migrants appear to have become more likely to be female, to work outside of 
agriculture, and to settle in the United States on a long-term basis.  Largely absent in the 
literature  is  analysis  of  the  life-cycle  behavior  of  migrants.    Many  individuals  from 
Mexico first enter the United States as illegal immigrants and over time gain a legal 
permanent residence visa through sponsorship by a U.S. family member.  One would 
expect that how a prospective migrant responds to changes in U.S. or Mexico economic 
conditions, or the extent to which a migrant already in the United States assimilates into 
U.S. society, would depend on whether the individual expects to obtain a U.S. green card 
in the future.  Family sponsorship in the granting of entry visas may thus create a direct 
link between receiving-country policies on legal immigration and the incentive for illegal 
immigration.  Individuals in Mexico with family members in the United States do appear 
to be more likely to emigrate.  However, we do not know whether this represents the 
effect  of  migration  networks,  which  lower  the  cost  of  migration,  or  prospects  for 
obtaining a green card, which raise the benefit to migration.   
 
  Consistent with research in many other contexts, Mexico-to-U.S. migration flows 
are correlated with changes in relative incomes in the two countries.  Attempted illegal 
immigration appears to be particularly responsive to shocks to the Mexican economy, 
with surges in apprehensions at the U.S.-Mexico border coming shortly after downturns 
in Mexico.  Yet, given the large magnitude of U.S.-Mexico wage differences and the 
small apparent cost of crossing the border illegally, the volume of migration flows from 
Mexico to the United States is surprisingly low.  Also, given the high relative return to 
education  in  Mexico,  it  is  puzzling  that  Mexican  immigrants  exhibit  intermediate 
selection in terms of their observable skills.  One would expect less-skilled Mexican 
immigrants to have the strongest incentive to migrate abroad.  Unobserved sources of 
heterogeneity in migration costs, home bias in consumption, and credit constraints in 
financing migration are all potential explanations for the volume and  composition of 
Mexican immigration.  Research on these issues is just beginning to emerge. 
 
  Over the last two decades, the United States has greatly increased the resources it 
devotes to controlling illegal immigration.  The government has, in particular, beefed up 
enforcement at specific U.S. border cities.  While the United States has criminalized the 
hiring of illegal immigrants, the government devotes few resources to monitoring U.S. 
worksites for the employment of unauthorized workers.  The net effect of changes in 
enforcement policy (coupled with changes in U.S. and Mexico economic conditions) has 
been  increasing  levels  of  illegal  immigration.    There  is  no  formal  political  economy 
theory of immigration control that would explain why the United States chooses border 
over interior enforcement.
64  The United States appears to be on the verge of granting an 
amnesty to at least some of the illegal immigrants residing in the country, which would 
come two decades after an earlier legalization under the Immigration Reform and Control 
                                                 
64  Ethier  (1986a)  includes  a  normative  analysis  of  border  versus  interior  enforcement  but  takes  the 
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extension of this analysis and consideration of an amnesty for illegal immigrants.   43 
Act.  There is also no formal theory that would explain why a country would choose to 
enact imperfect and costly enforcement against illegal immigration today and later grant 
an amnesty to those that entered illegally.  Given the importance of illegal immigration 
for the U.S. labor market and for U.S. public finances, policies to control labor inflows 
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Table 1:  Estimates of the U.S. Illegal-Immigrant Population, 1990-2004 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
  Total Population of Illegal Immigrants in the United States (millions) 
    Costanzo et al. (2003)  Bean et al. (2001a, 2001b)   
  INS  Undercount Rate  Undercount Rate  Passel 
Year   (2001)  10%  15%  20%  15%  Median  25%   (2005) 
                 
1990  3.500  3.766  4.430  4.707  --  --  --  -- 
1991  4.025  --  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
1992  4.204  --  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
1993  4.492  --  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
1994  4.750  --  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
1995  5.146  --  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
1996  5.581  --  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
1997  5.862  --  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
1998  6.098  --  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
1999  6.488  --  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
2000  7.000  8.705  10.242  10.882  --  --  --  -- 
2001  --  --  --  --  5.918  7.751  9.864  -- 
2002  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  9.300 
2003  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
2004  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  10.300 
                 
    Population of Illegal Immigrants from Mexico in the United States (millions) 
                 
1990  2.040  1.008  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
1996  --  --  --  --  1.524  2.543  3.706  -- 
2000  4.808  3.872  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
2001  --  --  --  --  3.462  4.510  5.765  -- 
2002  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  5.300 
2003  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
2004  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  5.900 
 
Notes:    Costanzo  et  al.  (2003)  report  estimates  of  the  total  U.S.  unauthorized  population  using  three 
alternative undercount rates for illegal immigrants (10%, 15%, or 20%).  The INS (2001) uses a constant 
undercount rate  for illegal immigrants of 10%, as does  Passel (2005).  The 1996 Bean el al. (2001a) 
estimates  are  based  on  undercount  rates  of  either  (a)  15%  for  illegal  immigrants  and  3%  for  legal 
immigrants, or (b) 25% for illegal immigrants and 5% for legal immigrants.  The 2001 Bean et al. (2001b) 
estimates are based on undercount rates of either (a) 15% for illegal immigrants and 0.5% for all legal 
immigrants (2% for legal Mexican immigrants), or (b) 25% for illegal immigrants and 2% for all legal 
immigrants (4% for legal Mexican immigrants).  The median estimates for Bean et al. (2001a, 2001b) are 
for the full set of reported of undercount rates, which vary depending on the year and sample.   55 
 
 
Table 2a:  Migrant and Non-Migrant Mexican Nationals, Males 
 
        Mexico Migration Project, 1989-1991   
        In Mexico at time of survey     
     
1990  















Percent Male  56.2  48.0  48.7  64.7  55.9  57.2 
               
Age  18 to 27   38.5  37.6  34.1  38.4  43.5  33.0 
  28 to 37   31.9  25.8  29.7  35.7  35.7  42.5 
  38 to 47   17.1  17.4  19.0  18.1  11.7  16.5 
  48 to 57   8.2  11.7  10.7  6.7  5.9  5.8 
  58 to 67   4.4  7.5  6.4  1.1  3.2  2.3 
               
Males Aged 18 to 47             
Years of  None  9.6  9.2  5.2  3.8  2.1  4.0 
Schooling  1 to 4  10.3  17.3  23.4  24.3  15.3  19.7 
  5 to 8  28.0  30.1  32.5  41.4  34.3  39.1 
  9 to 11  17.2  24.7  18.5  19.4  23.8  18.4 
  12 to 15  31.7  11.1  12.9  9.3  19.1  18.3 
  16 plus  3.2  7.7  7.5  1.8  5.6  0.5 
               
Live in Urban Area  91.9  74.8  80.6  74.5  89.2  -- 
In Labor Force  91.0  85.2  95.8  98.6  94.1  95.2 
Work in Agriculture  15.5  23.9  28.9  31.2  9.1  11.9 
Has Migrated to US  --  --  50.3  100.0  100.0  -- 
Migrate US Last Year  --  --  2.5  0.1  0.1  -- 
               
Years  0 to 5  28.8  --  65.6  45.2  36.9  13.9 
in US  6 to 10  23.4  --  14.8  17.3  20.2  19.4 
  11 to 20  35.7  --  15.2  28.2  36.3  6.7 
  20 plus  12.2  --  4.5  9.3  6.6  59.9 
               
Sample size, 18-67  96,487  196,729  5,370  722  375  1,670 
Sample size, 18-47  83,703  158,917  4,448  666  341  1,535 
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Table 2b:  Migrant and Non-Migrant Mexican Nationals, Females 
 
        Mexico Migration Project, 1989-1991   
        In Mexico at Time of Survey     
     
1990  














Percent Female  43.8  52.0  51.3  35.3  44.1  42.8 
               
Age  18 to 27   33.0  38.0  35.0  35.5  43.2  31.9 
  28 to 37   31.4  26.1  29.3  37.1  33.5  42.0 
  38 to 47   18.9  17.0  18.6  21.3  16.6  16.8 
  48 to 57   10.4  11.5  10.7  5.6  4.4  6.6 
  58 to 67   6.3  7.6  6.5  0.5  2.4  2.7 
               
Females Aged 18 to 47             
Years of  None  8.5  12.7  6.6  3.0  5.1  4.6 
Schooling  1 to 4  9.8  18.8  25.9  18.7  13.8  18.7 
  5 to 8  28.3  31.4  35.4  56.2  35.5  43.0 
  9 to 11  16.2  24.8  16.8  12.4  15.2  17.2 
  12 to 15  34.0  8.0  11.9  7.6  28.3  15.9 
  16 plus  3.3  4.4  3.5  2.2  2.2  0.6 
               
Live in Urban Area  92.7  75.8  80.6  70.8  88.8  -- 
In Labor Force  56.7  26.6  28.8  35.7  47.5  61.3 
Work in Agriculture  7.9  2.3  2.4  2.2  6.6  4.1 
Children Ever Born  2.6  3.3  --  --  --  -- 
Own Children in HH  1.7  1.6  1.8  1.0  2.2  2.1 
Has Migrated to US  --  --  18.6  100.0  100.0  -- 
Migrate US Last Year  --  --  0.8  0.0  0.0  -- 
               
Years in US  0 to 5  26.2  --  58.1  44.3  41.5  10.7 
  6 to 10  20.9  --  17.5  17.6  16.5  11.1 
  11 to 20  37.3  --  18.7  28.9  29.2  4.7 
  20 plus  15.6  --  5.7  9.2  12.7  73.5 
               
Sample size, 18-67  76,518  212,912  5,658  394  296  1,248 
Sample size, 18-47  63,278  172,458  4,688  370  276  1,132 
   57 
Notes:  Table 2 gives summary statistics on working-age adults, either 18-47 or 18-67 years old.  The 
samples are residents of Mexico (1990 Mexico Census of Population and Housing); Mexico-born residents 
of the United States (1990 U.S. Census of Population and Housing); respondents of the 1989-1991 Mexican 
Migration Project Survey (all respondents, those residing in United States but in Mexico at the time of the 
survey,  or  those  residing  in  United  States  at  the  time  of  the  survey  whose  responses  were  given  by 
household members in Mexico); and illegal immigrants from Mexico in the United States who qualified for 
amnesty  under the U.S. Immigration  Reform and Control Act (1989 Legalized Persons Survey).  The 






  Table 3a:  Average Hourly Wages for Mexican Males, 2000 
               
       Years of Schooling Completed    
   Age  4  5 to 8  9 to 11  12  13 to 15  16+ 
               
Mexican  18 to 22  7.83  7.60  7.45  8.07  8.76  8.44 
Immigrants  23 to 27  8.44  8.19  8.21  9.06  9.53  13.02 
in U.S.  28 to 32  8.27  8.56  8.70  9.66  9.56  15.69 
  33 to 37  9.46  9.25  9.34  10.07  11.36  16.84 
  38 to 42  9.19  9.39  9.33  11.01  12.11  16.26 
  43 to 47  9.75  8.90  9.35  10.68  12.80  15.88 
   48 to 52  9.57  9.37  9.42  9.31  11.65  17.78 
                       
Residents  18 to 22  1.36  1.56  1.76  2.06  2.61  3.91 
of Mexico  23 to 27  1.43  1.80  2.10  2.79  3.77  5.20 
  28 to 32  1.56  1.93  2.42  3.22  4.80  6.63 
  33 to 37  1.65  2.08  2.56  3.45  5.25  7.07 
  38 to 42  1.64  2.14  2.88  3.74  5.62  7.42 
  43 to 47  1.69  2.30  3.00  4.40  5.86  8.05 
   48 to 52  1.66  2.30  3.15  4.21  6.11  8.71 
 
Notes:  Table shows average hourly wages in 2000 U.S. dollars for Mexican immigrant males in the United 
States or male residents of Mexico who report working 20 to 84 hours a week (in either sample, the highest 
and lowest 0.5% of wage values are excluded).  Data for Mexico are a 10% random sample of the 10% 
microsample of the XIII Censo General de Poblacion y Vivienda, 2000; data for the United States are from 
the  5% U.S. PUMS in 2000.  Mexican immigrants are restricted to individuals who have resided in the 
United States for three years or less.  See the text on the calculation of wage values.   58 
 
Table 3b:  Log U.S.-Mexico Hourly Wage Differential, Males in 2000 
                   
     Years of Schooling Completed    
Age  4  5 to 8  9 to 11  12  13 to 15  16+ 
             
   Log U.S.-Mexico Wage Differential, All Males in Mexico 
18 to 22  1.263  1.098  0.985  0.895  0.750  0.361  
  (0.022)  (0.013)  (0.015)  (0.018)  (0.042)  (0.099) 
23 to 27  1.281  1.043  0.904  0.746  0.507  0.387  
  (0.024)  (0.015)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.038)  (0.048) 
28 to 32  1.225  1.036  0.821  0.652  0.306  0.357  
  (0.029)  (0.018)  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.047)  (0.052) 
33 to 37  1.258  1.025  0.823  0.613  0.339  0.294  
  (0.034)  (0.023)  (0.034)  (0.031)  (0.057)  (0.059) 
38 to 42  1.287  1.019  0.775  0.575  0.288  0.216  
  (0.035)  (0.029)  (0.045)  (0.043)  (0.068)  (0.075) 
43 to 47  1.265  0.905  0.708  0.498  0.275  0.118  
  (0.040)  (0.037)  (0.063)  (0.063)  (0.103)  (0.116) 
48 to 52  1.264  0.987  0.715  0.418  0.164  0.122  
   (0.050)  (0.046)  (0.096)  (0.076)  (0.122)  (0.142) 
             
   Log U.S.-Mexico Wage Differential, Males in High-Migration States 
18 to 22  1.188  1.061  0.989  0.912  0.676  0.381  
  (0.026)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.025)  (0.052)  (0.128) 
23 to 27  1.211  1.013  0.895  0.722  0.481  0.425  
  (0.027)  (0.017)  (0.019)  (0.024)  (0.050)  (0.052) 
28 to 32  1.144  1.011  0.824  0.657  0.361  0.415  
  (0.031)  (0.020)  (0.025)  (0.028)  (0.057)  (0.053) 
33 to 37  1.151  0.988  0.821  0.652  0.317  0.411  
  (0.035)  (0.025)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.061)  (0.060) 
38 to 42  1.206  0.966  0.792  0.601  0.185  0.291  
  (0.036)  (0.030)  (0.044)  (0.046)  (0.070)  (0.073) 
43 to 47  1.194  0.867  0.671  0.528  0.237  0.181  
  (0.041)  (0.037)  (0.061)  (0.067)  (0.101)  (0.112) 
48 to 52  1.193  0.961  0.727  0.292  0.284  0.227  
   (0.049)  (0.045)  (0.092)  (0.080)  (0.125)  (0.137) 
Notes:    Table  shows  the  log  difference  in  average  hourly  wages  (and  standard  errors)  for  Mexican 
immigrant males and male residents of Mexico.  The top half of the table includes all regions of Mexico; 
the bottom half includes only high-migration states.  See Table 3a and the text for details.   59 
 
Table 4:  Educational Attainment for the Mexico Born Population, 2000  
    21-65 Year Olds     28-37 Year Olds 
    Residents  Mex. Imm.    Residents  Mex. Immigrants in US 
     Of Mexico  in US     of Mexico  0-3 Yrs  4+ Yrs 
                
Males  0  0.069  0.127    0.036  0.076  0.078 
  1-4  0.166  0.080    0.103  0.045  0.043 
  5-8  0.270  0.307    0.263  0.303  0.275 
Highest  9  0.189  0.087    0.246  0.114  0.116 
Grade of  0-9  0.694  0.601     0.648  0.538  0.512 
Schooling               
(%)  10-11  0.045  0.055    0.059  0.064  0.067 
  12  0.101  0.212    0.129  0.260  0.278 
  13-15  0.047  0.083    0.044  0.075  0.098 
  10-15  0.193  0.350     0.232  0.399  0.443 
               
  16+  0.113  0.050     0.121  0.062  0.046 
               
N     215,804  80,453     68,206  9,358  15,839 
                
Females  0  0.092  0.133    0.047  0.070  0.078 
  1-4  0.179  0.087    0.116  0.041  0.043 
  5-8  0.280  0.315    0.278  0.269  0.294 
Highest  9  0.174  0.085    0.219  0.112  0.125 
Grade of  0-9  0.725  0.620     0.660  0.492  0.540 
Schooling               
(%)  10-11  0.040  0.049    0.054  0.056  0.062 
  12  0.112  0.204    0.145  0.276  0.253 
  13-15  0.042  0.079    0.039  0.083  0.090 
  10-15  0.194  0.332     0.238  0.415  0.405 
                 
  16+  0.080  0.048     0.103  0.093  0.055 
               
N     235,086  72,967     75,625  6,575  16,173 
 
Notes:  The sample is individuals 21-65 or 28-37 years old (in the U.S., excluding group quarters; in 
Mexico, excluding those not born in the country).  Residents of Mexico in 2000 are a 10% random sample 
of the 10% microsample of the XIII Censo General de Poblacion y Vivienda, 2000.  Mexican immigrants 
are from the 2000 5% U.S. PUMS and are restricted to be individuals 21 years or older at time of entry into 
the country who have been residing in the United States for 0-3 years or 4 or more years.  Schooling 
variables show the percentage of individuals whose high grade completed is that indicated.   Table 5:  Illegal Immigrants Located by U.S. Immigration Authorities, 1992-2004 
                           
   1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
                           
Total deportable aliens located   1.258  1.327  1.095  1.395  1.650  1.537  1.679  1.714  1.815  1.387  1.062  1.046  1.241 
(millions)                           
                           
Share located by ICE/INS Agents  0.047  0.048  0.058  0.050  0.061  0.080  0.074  0.079  0.076  0.087  0.101  0.110  0.065 
                           
                           
Share located by Border Patrol  0.953  0.952  0.942  0.950  0.939  0.920  0.926  0.921  0.924  0.913  0.899  0.890  0.935 
                           
   Of Border Patrol deportable                           
   aliens located, share that are:                           
     Mex. aliens seeking employment  0.888  0.884  0.874  0.895  0.907  0.906  0.899  0.901  0.910  0.875  0.861  0.870  0.860 
                           
     Mex. aliens at U.S. worksite  0.011  0.010  0.013  0.013  0.008  0.010  0.006  0.003  0.002  0.003  0.005  0.006  0.005 
                           
     Mex. aliens unspecified  0.076  0.079  0.082  0.069  0.068  0.067  0.073  0.068  0.064  0.089  0.095  0.070  0.070 
                           
     Other aliens  0.026  0.026  0.031  0.023  0.017  0.018  0.021  0.028  0.024  0.033  0.039  0.053  0.065 
 
Source:  U.S. Department of Homeland Security (http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/yearbook/index.htm). Mexican Immigrants in the US
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Figure 9:  Border Apprehensions and U.S.-Mexico Relative Per Capita Income    66 
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Figure 10: Immigrant (counterfactual) – Resident (actual) Wage Densities, 1990 and 2000 
(counterfactual density for Mexican immigrants minus actual density for Mexican residents)   67 
 
Year
 ln Mexico/US price level  ln Mexico/US terms of trade
 ln Mexico/US GDP per worker




















20 to 29 30 to 39 40 to 49 50 to 59
70 80 90 00 70 80 90 00 70 80 90 00 70 80 90 00
Pop. born in Mexico/Pop. of US natives w/ up to HS education
 

















20 to 29 30 to 39 40 to 49 50 to 59
70 80 90 00 70 80 90 00 70 80 90 00 70 80 90 00
Pop. born in Mexico/Pop. of US natives w/ up to HS education
 
Figure 12b:  Mexico-U.S. Relative Female Population, 1970-2000   69 


































































Ln Mex-US Relative Labor Supply




































 Texas  Western California
 Arizona  Eastern California






































 Texas  Western California
 Arizona  Eastern California






Figure 14b:  Linewatch Apprehensions by U.S. Border Patrol Region 